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I. INTRODUCTION
Case 1: A grandmother becomes concerned that neither her
daughter nor her son-in-law is capable of caring properly for her
grandson. They are getting a divorce. The child's father abuses
alcohol, and the mother never seems to have any money. The
mother is living in a shabby, cramped apartment with no yard
in which the boy can play. The grandmother intervenes in her




Case 2: A widower with an infant son marries a woman when
his child is less than a year old. Although the boy knows that
his "real mother is in heaven," he calls his'stepmother "Mom."
The stepmother does not adopt her husband's child, but she is
the boy's primary caretaker. After ten years, the husband and
wife decide to divorce. Both seek custody. The father claims that
he should prevail based on his wife's lack of a biological connec-
tion to the child.
Case 3: After her parents are divorced, a child lives with her
mother, stepfather, and half-siblings for several years. Her bio-
logical father visits with her regularly and pays all of his child
support on time. The child's mother dies suddenly, and her fa-
ther seeks custody from the stepfather.
Case 4: A mother voluntarily entrusts her two young boys to a
family member who lives several hundred miles away while she
enrolls in a substance abuse program. The whole process takes
over a year, but she recovers and gets a secure job. The mother
asks for her children back, but the family member refuses. The
mother pursues the matter in court.
Case 5: A young mother places her infant up for adoption, never
having told the baby's father that she was pregnant. He discov-
ers that fact many months after the adoption and goes to court
to reopen it. After two years of litigation, the appeals court final-
ly vacates the order terminating his parental rights. The father
has never met his daughter, but he wants her to live with him.
He files for custody from the couple who tried to adopt the girl
and with whom the child has been living for more than two
years.
These situations sample the variety of life stories that give
rise to "third-party" custody cases, child custody disputes be-
tween a biological or legally adoptive parent and anyone else
who is neither.' These disputes present courts and legislatures
1. In this Article, the term "parent" refers only to biological parents and individ-
uals who have adopted a child through appropriate legal channels, if the adoption is
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with issues more complex than the questions raised in custody
cases between two biological parents with equal status as "par-
ent."2 Third-party custody cases challenge both policymakers3
and decisionmakers to reexamine the very definition of "par-
ent ' 4 and to determine the significance of status5 and biology in
the custody decision.6 These cases also force a choice between
custody decisions based on the needs of the child and outcomes
based on the conduct of the parent.7 Certain of these cases high-
light the often conflicting societal values of providing nurturing
and safe homes for children and leaving parents free to raise
final. "Parent" does not include "psychological parents" or any other caregivers. The
term "nonparent" includes grandparents, other members of the child's extended fami-
ly, and all "biological strangers," regardless of their level of emotional attachment to
the child. Legally, their status as nonparent is the same. Lucy S. McGough & Law-
rence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Par-
ent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 212 n.19 (1978).
2. Some doctrines distinguish between parents on the basis of gender, such as
the tender-years presumption that young children should remain with their mother
or the theory that, all other things being equal, a court should give custody to the
same-sex parent. For a discussion of such theories, see David L. Chambers, Rethink-
ing the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477
(1984).
3. Throughout this Article, the term "policymakers" refers both to legislatures
and courts. In some states, statutes establish the standard for deciding third-party
custody cases, while in other jurisdictions, decisional case law sets the standard.
4. See, e.g., Janet L. Richards, The Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Par-
ties: Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 NOVA L. REV. 733 (1992).
5. Status is
grounded in inexorable truths (e.g., the truths of biological process). With-
in a universe of status, the obligations and rights that define relation-
ships flow automatically and inevitably from the fact of the relationship.
Thus, for instance, parents are expected to love and provide for their
children, not because they have agreed to do so, but simply because they
are parents.
Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition from Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond,
82 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1526 (1994). Status may "sanction[] significant inequities" among
the members of a family and between family members and individuals outside the
family, but it also "provid[es] for enduring relationships." Id. at 1571.
6. In this way, third-party custody cases are really a subset of cases within a
larger debate about the role of biology in the parenting process. The total number of
such cases continues to grow as medical technology expands the possible ways in
which humans can procreate. See John L. Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a 'Par-
ent?" The Claims of Biology As the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353
(1991).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 377-78 and accompanying text.
THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY
their children in their own way, without intrusion.8
A majority of jurisdictions emphasize the importance of par-
enthood status and thus require courts to decide third-party
custody cases differently from parent-versus-parent custody
cases.9 Most states give the parent some sort of preference in a
custody dispute with a nonparent, usually by creating a rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of the parent.'0 Few jurisdictions de-
fine this presumption with much specificity, particularly with
respect to the kind of evidence that rebuts it." Cases rarely
discuss the choice from the point of view of the child.
As the representative stories illustrate, the broad category of
third-party custody cases sweeps together several types of cases
that courts and legislators can and should distinguish in impor-
tant ways. The most basic distinction is whether the child is
living with the parent at the time that the case arises. If the
child is living with her' parent, the court faces a "removal"
case; it must decide whether to remove the child from her fami-
ly."3 If the child has already been in the care of someone other
than her parent for a period of time, the case involves "reunifica-
tion"; the court must decide whether to reunite the child with
her parent. 4 Further variations distinguish among the reunifi-
8. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297 (1988).
Bartlett suggests that several types of family cases reflect the tension of these con-
flicting values. She proposes a method for reshaping the debate about parenthood,
emphasizing parental responsibility rather than rights, and applies her model to
three types of cases: claims by unmarried women seeking "motherhood by choice," id.
at 306-15, claims by single women seeking to place their children up for adoption
over the objection of the father, id. at 315-26, and claims by "surrogate" mothers
who have changed their minds about giving up their children, id. at 326-37. Her
theory enriches the discussion of third-party custody cases as well.
9. See infra part II.B.1.
10. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
11. The Connecticut statute is a typical example. Only a "showing that it would
be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody" rebuts the pre-
sumption. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995).
12. For ease of reference, all hypothetical examples refer to the child as female
and the parent as male, unless otherwise specified. By no means does this choice
suggest that the standards would vary in any way based on the gender of either the
child or the parent.
13. Because of differences in standing rules and other jurisdictional considerations,
some states do not allow third-party custody removal cases. See infra notes 87-91
and accompanying text.
14. In a small percentage of cases, the decision may actually be whether to
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cation cases. 5 The most fundamental, difference in reunification
cases is the reason that the parent and child became separated:
whether the parent's conduct and capability to care for his child
were at the root of the existing separation between parent and
child. 6
Courts and legislatures tend to consider third-party custody
disputes in the aggregate and create one standard for all man-
ner of custody disputes between a parent and a nonparent.17 Of
course, any decisional standard for a range of cases as wide as
the situations illustrated must be general and broad. The trial
judges must then define for themselves how to balance the needs
of all the parties, what factors to consider, and how to weigh
them.
The failure to distinguish among cases based on differing
equitable considerations has resulted in a muddled debate about
the appropriate decisional standard for third-party custody cas-
es.'8 It has also caused a lack of clarity in discussions about the
effect of any preferential rule in favor of the parent. 9 In addi-
tion, the courts remain confused about what type of evidence is
truly relevant in these cases.2"
"unite" parent and child for the first time. See infra part II.A.2.b.
15. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the exceptions to this rule, see infra part II.B.2. Some
commentators address only one variety of cases, such as reunification cases. See, e.g.,
James G. OKeefe, The Need To Consider Children's Rights in Biological Parent v.
Third Party Custody Disputes, 67 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 1077, 1081 n.30 (1991).
18. See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
19. For differing views on the effect of the preference, without any acknowledge-
ment of the variety of case types, compare Richards, supra note 4 (arguing for a
balancing of the rights of society, the parent, and the child) with Suzette M. Haynie,
Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody Is Constitu-
tionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705 (1986) (asserting that the parental rights
standard is unconstitutional) and Eric P. Salthe, Note, Would Abolishing the Natural
Parent Preference in Custody Disputes Be in Everyone's Best Interest?, 29 J. FAMI. L.
539 (1990-1991) (calling a natural parent preference "archaic" and "harmful").
20. Compare the evidence on which the court focused in two cases in which par-
ents sought to regain custody from grandparents. In Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907
(Conn. 1989), the court did not let a strained relationship between the parent and
the child prevent the parent from prevailing, id. at 909, 916. The court primarily
discussed the effect that the custody change would have on the child's emotional
development. Id. at 916. In Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966), the court focused on the alternative lifestyle chosen by
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This Article first recommends a definitional system for the
various types of third-party custody cases. The system groups
case types according to factors relevant to the process of choos-
ing a decisional standard. The Article then surveys the relevant
constitutional principles that shape, inform, and sometimes limit
the choice of a standard for deciding these cases. Finally, it
proposes standards for resolving each category within the wide
spectrum of third-party custody cases. The standards reflect a
strong bias in favor of viewing the custody choice through the
eyes of the child. Nonetheless, the Article suggests that a pref-
erence in favor of the parent rather than a best-interests-of-the-
child test is appropriate for all types of third-party custody cas-
es, with one limited exception. This Article then suggests that
the use of a presumption, often with vaguely defined standards
for its rebuttal, is an ill-advised and confusing method of ex-
pressing the preference.
The best method of defining the parameters of the preference
given in each kind of case is to articulate directly the circum-
stances under which a court should separate the parent and
child in a removal case and the conditions under which the court
should not restore custody to the parent in a reunification case.
In removal cases, the court should focus only on the capability of
the parent to provide the child with her basic needs. In reunifi-
cation cases, the court should ignore the parent's responsibility
or "blameworthiness" for creating the separation and look only
to the psychological impact that a change in custody will have
on the child. The effect of the preference is that, unless one of a
set of identified conditions exists, the court should award custo-
dy of the child to the parent. To respond to the fundamentally
different controversies presented by removal and the several
types of reunification cases, the recommended standards include
the type and quantum of evidence that should be necessary to
overcome the preference.
the parent, with the judges clearly disapproving, id. at 154.
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II. DEFINING THE CONTEXT
A. The Categories of Third-Party Custody Cases
In all third-party custody cases, someone other than the
child's legal or biological parent competes against one or both
such parents for custody of the child.2 A broad range of family
problems and situations may result in a claim by a relative or
family friend to raise the child.22
The reality today is that many children do not grow up in the
traditional construct of a family-two natural parents, a full
sibling or two, a dog, a cat, and a minivan.' An increase in the
percentage of parents with serious problems results in an in-
crease in abuse and neglect petitions and also affects the num-
ber of third-party custody cases.' In particular, the number of
children raised by their grandparents has increased markedly in
recent years.25 Studies indicate that teenage pregnancy, sub-
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., cases 1-5 described supra.
23. The living patterns of children have changed over the last three decades. The
traditional nuclear family, in which children live with both biological parents and
only full siblings, is a decidedly less frequent situation. David Popenoe, American
Family Decline, 1960-1990: A Review and Appraisal, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 527,
531 (1993). According to a U.S. Census Bureau report of children's living ar-
rangements in the summer of 1991, approximately 48 million children under the age
of 18 lived in the following types of households: 50.8% lived with two biological
parents in a traditional nuclear family; 72.8% lived with two "parents," defined to
include biological, step, adoptive, and foster parents; 24% lived with one "parent";
2.7% lived with neither "parent"; 7.2% lived with at least one grandparent, 23.2% of
whom had no parent with them in the grandparent's home. STACY FURUKAWA, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE DIVERSE LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: SUMMER
1991 (Current Population Report, Series P70, No. 38, 1994). These living pattern sta-
tistics only begin to demonstrate the degree to which formal and informal alterna-
tive parenting arrangements exist in America. Research suggests that the family
structure has a strong impact on a child's psychological development, well-being, and
likelihood of future behavioral problems and delinquency. See, e.g., R. Jean Haurin,
Patterns of Childhood Residence and the Relationship to Young Adult Outcomes, 54
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 846 (1992).
24. A third-party custody suit is simply another procedural mechanism by which a
nonparent who is concerned about a parent's ability to care for a child may seek to
assume the daily care of that child.
25. Nationwide, three million grandparents are raising their grandchildren. Karen
Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency
in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1315 n.1 (1994) (citing GRANDPARENTS: NEW ROLES
THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY
stance abuse, AIDS, child abuse and neglect, and parental incar-
ceration are the major causes of parental incapacity that has
resulted in a rise in grandparent custody. 6 Economic hardship,
caused by unemployment or nonpayment of child support, may
have also increased the number of parents with children forced
to move back into the grandparents' household. Such scenarios
can cause friction and possibly a custody dispute when the par-
ent is ready to live independently with his child."
The increase in the divorce and remarriage rate creates yet
another common spawning ground for third-party custody dis-
putes. Children raised in "blended" families consisting of
nonparents, stepparents, and half- and step-siblings inevitably
form strong emotional bonds with those people. A challenge to
the integrity of this second family or its breakup may well result
in difficult custody choices.
Finally, medical breakthroughs in reproductive technology
have stretched the usual definitions of parenthood and can re-
sult in the formation of families that do not share traditional
biological connections.' If the family splits, courts face interest-
ing and sometimes novel questions.29
The very definition of a third-party custody case-a contest in
which one of the participants lacks parental status-emphasizes
the most basic of issues in all of these cases: in deciding who
should raise the child, how important is the biological connection
AND RESPONSIBILITIES, A BRIEFING BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HU-
MAN SERVICES OF THE SELECT COhfMITTEE ON AGING, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMi. PUB. No. 102-876, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1992) (statement of Danylle J.
Rudin)). A million of them are doing so without help from the children's parents. Id.
The number of children living with relatives other than their parents has increased
by 40% in the last decade. Id.
26. See, e.g., Muriel Banquer et al., Grandparents Raising Grandchildren: A Needs
Assessment (1994) (unpublished study by the Elderly Program of the Consultation
Center, New Haven, Connecticut) (on file with Author). These problems also may
result in foster care placement, but grandparents increasingly assume care. Id.; see
supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984) (denying custody to
a child's grandmother who had originally assumed responsibility for the boy at the
request of the teenaged mother).
28. For a thorough discussion of the effects of advances in medical technology on
family law issues, see Hill, supra note 6.
29. See, e.g., infra note 41.
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between a natural parent and child or the legally accorded con-
nection between an adoptive parent and child? The answer may
vary depending on the kind of case, but the question is there,
waiting to be addressed, in every third-party situation.
Every case, whether removal or reunification, will also re-
quire the court to decide whether to remove the child from the
home in which she is now living. Any move would be at the
expense of the existing bond between the child and her caretak-
er, whether a parent or nonparent. The proper weight to accord
the child's interest in maintaining continuity with her present
caretaker is therefore a second major issue present in every
third-party custody case. The corollary issue-the proper weight
to accord the caretaker's interest in remaining with the
child-is also omnipresent.
Beyond these factors common to all third-party cases are a
variety of other considerations. Who is seeking to remove custo-
dy from the parent? Have the parent who seeks custody and the
child ever lived together before? How did the parent and the
child come to be separated in the first place? How long has the
child lived with the nonparent caretaker? Rather than create
one broad test that applies to all these situations, courts should
divide the cases into groups according to the most salient and
important commonalities. Some variables are nothing more than
descriptive details with no bearing on the test that the court
should use to choose the custodian;"' others may not affect
which test the court selects but will be very significant to the
ultimate custody choice." Still others go to the very heart of
what measure the court should adopt to decide the case. 2
The most fundamental variable is whether the child is living
with the parent at the time that the custody dispute arises."
30. For example, whether the nonparent is related to the child is a factual vari-
ation that should not affect a case's result.
31. In a reunification case, the child's age at the time she went to live with the
nonparent is a key factor in the custody decision. See In re Jacqueline D., Nos. N87-
128 & 82341, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1037, at *8-10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15,
1992). This Article does not categorize cases on the basis of the variations in the
age of the child.
32. For example, this Article divides all third-party cases into two groups based
on whether the child is already living with the nonparent.
33. An important caveat qualifies this apparently simple rule. In a reunification
1054
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The answer to this question serves as a major dividing line be-
tween the two major types of cases. All third-party cases will fit




A removal case involves a claim that a court should remove a
child from the care of her parent.34 It arises when a nonparent
seeks custody of the child, typically by alleging that either par-
ent, or both, is not a fit custodian. Sometimes, however, the
allegations actually hide little more than the nonparent's disap-
proval of a parent's lifestyle choices. 5 The grandmother in the
first of the introductory examples intervened in her daughter's
divorce to seek custody because she was concerned that neither
of her grandson's parents were capable of caring for him. She
thereby precipitated a classic removal case.
All removal cases present a common issue: what conditions
justify separating a parent and child? In this way, removal cases
are identical to abuse and neglect proceedings initiated by a
state child protection agency. This similarity requires
policymakers to ask whether a different standard should apply
case, the child must be living with the nonparent as a result of a court order or
under circumstances in which the parent originally consented to the arrangement. In
cases in which the parent originally agreed to allow the nonparent to care for the
child, the parent obviously has withdrawn his consent. A kidnapping or custodial
interference case is obviously a very different matter not covered under the terms of
a third-party custody case.
In order to qualify as a reunification case, the child also must have been living
with the nonparent in excess of six months. If the case involves any lesser time
period, the court should decide the dispute under the rules for a removal case, even
if the child continues to stay with the nonparent while the action is pending.
34. For example, in Foster v. Devino, No. 0110479, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1161 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 1994), grandparents intervened in a custody action
between an unmarried couple pursuant to the state's intervention statute, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-57 (West 1986). Similarly, in Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796
S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990), grandparents intervened in their son's divorce action, re-
questing to be named the "managing conservator" of their grandchild.
35. Richards, supra note 4, at 734; see, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E,2d 102
(Va. 1995) (involving a grant of custody to a grandparent, at least in part due to
the grandmother's disapproval of the mother's lesbian lifestyle).
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when a private individual rather than the state forces the ques-
tion. Should the conditions that justify removal depend on the
entity requesting the removal?
In some jurisdictions, no answer to this question is necessary.
The standing and procedural rules prohibit the initiation of
third-party custody removal cases. These states deny nonparents
access to the courts, whether by initiation of their own suits or
by intervention in an existing dispute between the natural par-
ents, unless the child is already out of her parents' home." In
these jurisdictions, a nonparent who is concerned about a child's
safety or the quality of her care is limited to making a complaint
to the appropriate child protection agency or initiating a guard-
ianship proceeding. If the nonparent's concerns are less serious
than safety or quality care, he would have no recourse.
b. A Special Kind of Case
The broad definition of a third-party custody case gathers
within its net one kind of case that is fundamentally different
from the others. In these situations, both adults have acted as
"parents" to the child simultaneously, and have themselves ig-
nored the lack of a biological or legal connection between the
child and one of the adults." These cases are, however, techni-
cally speaking, custody disputes between a parent, usually bio-
logical, and a nonparent.
Consider the example of the widower father and child who
lived for a significant period of time with the stepmother, creat-
ing a nuclear family unit."5 When the father and stepmother
36. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 550 (1973).
Courts refused standing to nonparents in In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649
(Mich.), stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1, and 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993), and In re Custody of
Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150 (Ill. 1986).
37. These examples assume that the non-biologically related adult did not legally
adopt the child. If she had done so, the status of the two parents would be legally
identical.
38. Traditionally, a nuclear family is a "conjugal household," consisting of a hus-
band and wife and their dependent children. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Par-
enthood As an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of
the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 879 n.1 (1984). The children
may be either the parents' biological issue or their legal adoptees. The nonparent
may or may not be of the same gender as the parent, and the existence of any
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subsequently separated, the child faced removal from one or the
other adult, both of whom enjoyed a caretaking role in the
child's life and both of whom the child loved." A similar situa-
tion may arise if one partner in a homosexual relationship be-
comes the biological progenitor of a child that the couple intends
to raise together.0 Similarly, if one partner in a heterosexual
relationship has a fertility problem, the couple may choose sur-
rogacy or sperm or egg donation, so that only one of the adults
will actually have a biological link to the child.4' If either of
these couples separates, the child's custody becomes an issue.
In all other third-party custody cases, the court must decide
which of two separate families should care for the child." The
nonparent is an "outsider" to the family and is seeking to dis-
rupt the integrity of the parent-child relationship. In this special
kind of case, however, the court must choose which adult will
live with the child after a single family unit dissolves. The dis-
pute does not involve a claim for custody by a person outside of
the nuclear family unit.43 Rather, the biological parent has in-
tentionally created a family with the "nonbiological parent" and
has encouraged the strong attachment between the child and the
marital relationship between the two adults is irrelevant. It matters only that they
form a household with the intent to create a family with two adult members.
39. These examples assume that the other biological parent is not a party to the
custody dispute.
40. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families,
78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
41. See, e.g., Haftel v. Haftel, No. FA-91-0060834-S, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1892 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 1994). From birth, the child lived with his biological
father and the father's wife, whom the child believed to be his biological mother. Id.
at *1-2. In fact, however, the child was the offspring of a woman artificially insemi-
nated with the father's sperm because of the wife's fertility problem. Id. at *1. The
wife did not adopt the child. When the husband and wife divorced, the father
claimed a superior right to custody solely because of his genetic link to the child.
See id. at *2.
42. See supra note 34.
43. This category does not include cases in which the parent and child both lived
with a grandparent, other relative, or a friend. The dynamics of a multigenerational
extended family or communal household are not the same as a nuclear family. The
parent does not share authority with or change the status of the nonparent simply
by living in a group including that individual. One commentator argues for the de-
velopment of "co-guardianship" for caretaking grandparents. Czapanskiy, supra note
25, at 1319.
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other adult. This kind of case has much more in common with a
traditional parent-versus-parent custody dispute. To the child in-
volved, the family split and the custody quandary will feel the
same as if both adults were her natural parents. Her family, as
she has known it, has ceased to exist.
Moreover, this kind of case also differs from other third-party
cases because it has elements of both a removal and a reunifica-
tion case. Although the nonparent seeks to remove the child
from the parent's custody, the parent is simultaneously attempt-
ing to remove the child from the nonparent's care."
2. Reunification Cases
Reunification cases arise as the result of a broader variety of
situations than removal cases; however, they all share some
common and significant traits. In all such cases, a person other
than the parent cares for the child. Although a relationship of
great affection and emotional connection may still remain, the
close day-to-day relationship between the parent and the child
already has been interrupted. Presumably, the child has devel-
oped a close emotional bond with the nonparent." Consequent-
ly, every reunification case presents the issue of the weight to be
accorded the bond between the child and the nonparent. Reunifi-
cation cases are precipitated by a parent's request to have custo-
dy restored to him.46 Without exception, the states have proce-
44. Inclusion of this scenario in the category of removal cases highlights the key
question presented: when two adults have raised a child together in the context of a
nuclear family setting, should the court attach any significance to the nonexistence
of a biological or legal connection between the child and one of the "parents?" Advo-
cates for children's rights answer this question with a resounding "no." Barbara B.
Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights': The Child's Voice in Defin-
ing the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 321, 335 (1994).
45. However, such bonds do not always exist. If the child is old enough to express
herself and says that she wants to live with the parent, the courts tend to consider
the child's preference, assuming the parent is fit. See Sheppard v. Hood, 605 So. 2d
708, 712 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Merritt v. Merritt, 550 So. 2d 882, 890 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Venable v. Venable, 445 N.E.2d 1125, 1130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
46. If the state's standing rules permit it, a nonparent might be the moving party
in a reunification case. For example, if the parent has withdrawn his consent to an
informal and voluntary arrangement, the nonparent may win the race to the court-




dures for a parent to initiate a reunification case through a writ
of habeas corpus or another procedural mechanism.47 No state
denies a parent standing to bring such a case.
a. The Cause of the Separation
Despite the similarities in all reunification cases, significant
factual variations exist. There are two major classes of reunifi-
cation cases. They differ with respect to the cause of the separa-
tion between parent and child.
In the first category of reunification cases, the key factor is
that some condition on the parent's part caused the separation
(a "parental condition" case). The parent's conduct or condition
prevented him from caring for the child in an adequate manner.
The conduct may be of the sort to which society traditionally
attaches fault or blame labels, such as substance abuse or illegal
activity resulting in incarceration. The condition need not be
something over which the parent had any control, however, such
as a mental or physical illness. It may be just that the parent is
too young to be willing and able to take on the responsibility of
parenthood."
Some of these reunification cases arise as the second stage to
a court-ordered removal, after the parent has rehabilitated him-
self and returned to court for a modification of custody.49 Oth-
ers result from the actions of a parent trying to undo a private
and voluntary custody arrangement" gone awry.5' In such a
47. See, e.g., Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en banc) (habeas corpus
case filed by a parent); Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989) (modification ac-
tion initiated by a parent).
48. See, e.g., Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984) (third-party custody
dispute involving a boy born to a teenaged mother).
49. See, e.g., Busa v. Busa, 589 A.2d 370 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
50. This variety of case may also involve a parent so overwhelmed that he agrees
to place his children for adoption but then changes his mind.
51. Stell v. Stell, 783 P.2d 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). A parent's socioeconomic
status and his tendency to use voluntary placements during a crisis may well cor-
relate. Professor Guggenheim posits that, if a parent has a problem, the State is
more apt to seize children from poor and minority families than from middle- or
upper-class families. A middle- or upper-class parent will have family resources to
assist them or financial resources to hire help, so the State will never know about
the family crisis. Martin Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications of the
Psychological Parenting Theory, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 549, 549-50
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situation, the reunification case represents the first time that
the parties have come before any court. A mother sending her
children to a distant family member while she is in a substance
abuse treatment program illustrates a typical "parental condi-
tion" case.
The example of the custodial mother and her child who lived
with the stepfather after divorce and remarriage illustrates the
second class of reunification cases, a "second family" case.52 The
dispute arose when the father pursued custody from the step-
father after the mother's death.53 In such cases, no underlying
parental problem interfered with the parent's capability to care
for his children. Instead, the child came to live with the
nonparent as a consequence of the custody decision between two
biological parents and the subsequent formation of a new living
arrangement by the custodial parent.54
The cause of the separation is a defining feature, not neces-
sarily because it will make a difference in the result,55 but be-
cause it forces policymakers to confront a basic question: should
a parent's responsibility or lack of responsibility for the separa-
tion make a difference in the custody decision?
(1983-1984); see also Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 423, 432-33 (1983) (claiming that the foster system is used predominantly by
and against the poor). Professor Guggenheim also suggests that, once the State has
intervened in a family, the child is less likely to return home. See Guggenheim,
supra, at 550.
While state intervention is undoubtedly a serious action, in some cases private
arrangements may be more dangerous to the goal of reunification. A state typically
uses an imperfect system to intervene, but statutorily mandated safeguards protect
the parent. Unless courts construe third-party custody cases similarly, a voluntary
placement arrangement gone awry will give the parent fewer safeguards and thus
less certainty that his child will ever come home again.
52. The nonparent may also be any relative or a person to whom the custodial
parent is not married.
53. Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en banc), is the archetype of this
category.
54. Because the best-interests-of-the-child custody standard applies only between
two parents, the noncustodial parent may lose custody without any finding of a
limitation on his parenting skills. See, e.g., id. at 121. No inference of poor
parenting is appropriate. Id.
55. This factor does, however, affect the analysis of the constitutionality of the
various approaches. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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b. The Absence of a Prior Custodial Relationship
Most reunification cases involve parents who lived with their
children at some point prior to their separation." This fact
need not always be true, however. In some cases, the parent and
the child may have never previously lived together. In these
situations, the term "reunification" may technically be a misno-
mer, but such scenarios share common elements with other
reunification cases. As in all reunification situations, the child is
in the care of a nonparent and the parent wants custody.
A parent who has never previously lived with his child may
wish custody under several circumstances. Perhaps the parents
of a child never lived together or separated prior to the child's
birth. If the custodial parent dies or otherwise leaves the child
with a nonparent, the noncustodial parent may file for custody.
This scenario would be nothing more than a variant of the sec-
ond group of reunification cases, in which the dispute is the
result of the custodial parent's formation of a "second family"
and not a consequence of the noncustodial parent's incapacity.
Reunification cases resulting from a "parental condition" may
also include cases in which the parent and child have never
before lived together. The most notorious situation is the "failed"
or "rescinded" adoption case of an infant." In these cases, the
child usually has been in the custody of the prospective adoptive
parents for a significant period58 by the time the courts finally
decide on the validity of the adoption.
A rescinded adoption case fits well within this definition of
the "parental condition" type of reunification case. 9 The custo-
56. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
57. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1,
and 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993). Although the reasons that parents place their children for
adoption are too numerous and personal to catalog, they all fit roughly within the
"parental condition" category.
58. In the well-known "Baby Jessica" case, the father first filed to halt the
adoption when she was six weeks old. Id. at 652. The child did not go to live with
her biological parents until she was two and one-half years old.
59. Jurisdictions vary with respect to whether they define a rescinded adoption
case as a third-party custody case. For example, once the Iowa court denied the
DeBoers' petition to adopt "Baby Jessica," the fight in the Michigan courts became a
third-party custody case between the parents and the nonparent custodians. Id. at
653. Because third parties have no standing to bring a custody case in Michigan,
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dy dispute between the parent and the prospective adoptive
parent involves a claim for continued custody by a nonparent
outside of the biological family unit. It presents the same factual
and equitable considerations as do other reunification cases. The
court must consider the protected rights of the parent, but must
do so in light of the child's emotional attachment to the
nonparent. Thus, if the adoption is vacated, the court must still
decide, as a separate issue, where the child should live.6" The
third-party custody category offers a ready-made method for
considering all the parties' interests.
In either type of reunification case, the noncustodial parent
seeking custody from the nonparent may never have had any-
thing more than a visiting-parent relationship.6 This circum-
the court dismissed the DeBoers' custody request. Id. at 668.
Some states consider the issue of physical custody a matter separate from the
issue of legal custody. See, e.g., In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337, 1341-42
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 892 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1995). Other jurisdictions deem the
return of the child to follow automatically from the decision not to terminate the
parent's rights. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d 1, 8-9 (Conn. 1992). The teen-
age mother in that case changed her mind about giving up her infant. Id. at 4-6.
The court reopened and vacated the judgment terminating her parental rights and
returned the child to her. Id. at 21.
60. A child is "not a misaddressed parcel that, once the error is discovered, should
be shipped to the correct recipient." Joan H. Hollinger, A Failed System Is Tearing
Kids Apart, NATL L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 17-18.
One commentator strongly recommends that all states consider failed adoptions
as third-party custody cases, criticizing the practice of automatically sending children
to live with their biological parents if the adoption is not made final. Kirsten Korn,
Comment, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption Disputes
Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1330 (1994).
Korn reports on the Vermont case of "Baby Pete," in which the natural father suc-
cessfully challenged the termination of his parental rights, but then settled the cus-
tody issue with the prospective adoptive parents so that the child remained with
them, and the father had visitation. Id. at 1285.
61. In some limited situations, the parent seeking custody may not have any rela-
tionship at all with his child. The father whose child was placed for adoption with-
out his knowledge is such an example. See, e.g., Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649. As long
as the father pursued his rights immediately upon learning of the existence of the
child, he may bring a third-party action for custody.
Courts should not construe this narrow opportunity for a parent in a disputed
adoption case to allow a biological father who has expressed no prior interest in his
child to surface years later and seek custody from either the other parent or a non-
parent. In many jurisdictions, such a delay would justify the termination of parental
rights due to the lack of an ongoing parental relationship. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17a-112(b) (West Supp. 1995). It certainly should serve to cut off the
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stance should not exclude automatically the noncustodial parent
from consideration, nor should it necessarily preclude the parent
from enjoying the benefit of a parental preference. If, however,
the absence of the prior custodial relationship is to affect the
ultimate result-make the parent less likely to prevail-then the
challenge is to create a standard that permits the trial judge to
take this factor into account.
B. Existing Approaches for Deciding Third-Party Custody Cases
1. Overview of Standards
Children historically have been viewed as the property of their
parents. 2 Even into the early twentieth century, courts in the
United States held almost uniformly that a father had the right
to custody of his children as a matter of property law or title.63
Courts gradually began to recognize, however, that these proper-
ty rights were not absolute. They based their earliest decisions
holding that children had the right to be free from neglect and
abuse on the notion ofparens patriae, the common-law right and
responsibility of the king and feudal lords to intervene in a fami-
ly to protect children at risk of injury.' This over-arching right
father's entitlement to a preference in any custody action.
62. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). According to Blackstone, fathers in ancient Rome had abso-
lute power of life or death over their children. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAR-
IES *440. In Puritan New England, parents could have a stubborn or rebellious son
put to death. John R. Sutton, Stubborn Children: Law and the Socialization of Devi-
ance in the Puritan Colonies, 15 FAM. L.Q. 31, 31 (1981); see also Deuteronomy
21:18-21 (directing parents to have stubborn and rebellious sons stoned). The book of
Deuteronomy probably was the basis of the Puritan laws. Sutton, supra, at 39.
63. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wright, 62 P. 613, 614 (Cal. 1900) (stating that a
father's right to custody is a property right). See generally Paul Sayre, Awarding
Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 672, 675 (1942) (explaining the historic inter-
pretation of custody as a property interest).
64. Parens patriae means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114
(6th ed. 1990). English Chancery courts first used the term to refer to the rights of
lords to profit from wards. Custer, supra note 62, at 195-96. It later evolved into
the doctrine authorizing and obligating the state as "supreme guardian" to intervene
in families to protect infants, lunatics, and idiots. Id. at 196-201; McGough &
Shindell, supra note 1, at 209 n.2; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (chal-
lenging the historic foundations of the phrase); Michael B. Thompson, Child Custody
Disputes Between Parents and Non-Parents: A Plea for the Abrogation of the Paren-
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evolved into the modern American view that the State's interest
in protecting children65 requires courts to apply the best-inter-
ests-of-the-child standard when deciding custody cases, at least
in disputes between parents.66 Once children ceased to be
viewed as chattel, of either the throne or their parents, states
also had to create an approach to the custody disputes that
arose between parents and nonparents. States have adopted
standards for deciding these custody disputes either by case law
or by legislation.7 Some jurisdictions apply the same standard
to third-party custody disputes as they would to parent-versus-
parent custody disputes." Most apply different standards.69
The standards applied by the states can be grouped into three
categories: (1) a parental rights test, (2) a preference in favor of
the parent, and (3) a best interests test.70
tal-Right Doctrine in South Dakota, 34 S.D. L. REV. 534, 551-54 (1989) (explaining
the feudal origins of the phrase). In some early cases, the Chancellor removed chil-
dren from abusive or drunken "blasphemous" parents. See, e.g., Skinner v. Warner,
21 Eng. Rep. 473 (Ch. 1792) (issuing a restraining order to prevent a father from
asserting his superior guardianship right to remove a child from her mother and her
school). In the United States, the most well-known early child abuse case was the
Mary Ellen Wilson case of 1874. McGough & Shindell, supra note 1, at 210 & n.7;
see also Monrad G. Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 679, 681-86 (1966) (providing an overview of statutes protecting children
from abuse).
65. The State's authority to intervene in a family actually comes from two distinct
sources. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1198 (1980) [hereinafter Developments]. The first is the State's inherent
police power to prevent citizens from harming one another and to promote commu-
nity and public welfare. Id. at 1198-99. The second is the paternalistic power to pro-
tect incompetents and to ensure the individual incompetent's best interest. Id. at
1199. For a thorough discussion of the two sources of the State's authority, their ori-
gins, and their application, see id.
66. McGough & Shindell, supra note 1, at 221. States also developed gender-neu-
tral statutes giving custody and guardianship rights to both parents rather than just
to fathers. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-606 (West 1993).
67. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995) (providing an exam-
ple of a legislatively prescribed standard); In re Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277
(N.Y. 1976) (providing an example of a judicially created standard).
68. See Haynie, supra note 19, at 721 n.58 (listing the states that apply a "best
interests" test).
69. Id. at 708-21.
70. See id. at 706. It is not feasible to set forth definitively the standard that
each state has adopted. A full tracking of each state's custody law, statutory and
decisional, would be necessary. Further, some states have not really enunciated a
standard. McGough & Shindell, supra note 1, at 214-15 n.24. Several authors have
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The parental rights standard requires courts to award the
parent custody unless the nonparent shows that the parent is
unfit.7' Unless extraordinary circumstances exist as a threshold
matter, a parental rights standard prevents a trial court from
even considering the nonparent as custodian.72 Some parental
rights jurisdictions view this standard as a matter of policy;"
others consider it a constitutional mandate. 4
On the other end of the continuum, the best-interests-of-the-
child test focuses solely on the interests of the child and treats
the legal status of the putative custodians as irrelevant."5
States applying this standard use it in both parent-versus-par-
ent and parent-versus-nonparent custody disputes."6 A best in-
terests test defines the relative benefits to the child of being
with one or the other party.7" It requires the court to compare
attempted to assign a standard to each state and have reached different conclusions.
Compare id. at 213 (finding that most states apply the best interests standard) with
Haynie, supra note 19, at 711 (claiming that a majority of states apply the parental
preference standard). Some authors have simply made mistakes. The Haynie article
counts Connecticut as a best interests state, id. at 725, based on McGaffin v. Rob-
erts, 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985). The author mis-
sed that, in 1985, the state enacted a statute specifically overruling McGaffin. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995).
71. Haynie, supra note 19, at 708.
72. Extraordinary circumstances in New York are abandonment, abuse, neglect, or
parental unfitness. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1976); see also
Blackburn v. Blackburn, 292 S.E.2d 821, 825 (Ga. 1982) (requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence of present unfitness before terminating parental rights).
73. See, e.g., Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 285; see also Thompson, supra note 64 (dis-
cussing the parental rights standard in South Dakota).
74. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled the best interests test unconstitutional in
third-party custody cases. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982). But see McGough & Shindell, supra note 1, at 244
(positing that the parental rights test is unconstitutional in the third-party context).
75. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (Supp. 1992).
76. For example, Hawaii has adopted a best interests test by statute and even
gives a presumption favoring the award of custody to a nonparent with whom the
child has been living.
Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother
whenever the award serves the best interests of the child. Any person
who has had de facto custody of the child in a stable and wholesome
home and is a fit and proper person shall be entitled prima facie to an
award of custody ....
Id.
77. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257-61 (1975).
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the total package of attributes of the two potential custodi-
ans-their homes, their larger environments, and their relation-
ships with the child.7" The two adults start on a level playing
field. Any one factor, even a small one, can tip the scale in ei-
ther direction.79
Between the best interests and parental rights tests is the
hybrid standard that attempts to strike a balance between the
rights of the parent and the needs of the child. The basis of this
approach lies in the principles that the parent has a right to
rear his child, the child has a right to be reared by her parent,
and that these rights ordinarily converge.8 ° The courts thus as-
sume that the child and the parent belong together, but recog-
nize that circumstances other than parental unfitness may ren-
der the parent's custody inappropriate. The majority of the
states use some variation of this parental preference ap-
proach.8 This intermediate standard usually takes the form of
a presumption in favor of the parent, with the third party per-
mitted to rebut that presumption.82
78. Scholars have criticized the best interests test as being too broad because it
gives too little guidance to judges and as being too narrow because the child's inter-
ests are not the only factors considered. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 2, at 478.
Some states have best interests statutes that do enumerate specific factors to guide
judges. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3
(Michie 1995). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act enumerates the following
factors as relevant to a consideration of the child's best interests:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does
not affect his relationship to the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1973).
79. For example, courts could make custody decisions based on the relative quality
of school systems, whether one party smokes, or whether one parent uses a day care
center for child care.
80. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
81. The variations and evolving case law make an exact count difficult. However,
one recent author counts 29, even while overlooking Connecticut. Haynie, supra note
19, at 711 n.22.
82. For example, Connecticut and Texas have presumption statutes. CONN. GEN.
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In some states that have adopted the parental preference ap-
proach, the burden of persuasion is always on the nonparent,"
while other jurisdictions allow the procedural posture of the case
to dictate which party has the burden.' States also vary with
respect to whether they require clear and convincing evidence 5
or a preponderance of evidence"8 to rebut the presumption.
Not all struggles by a parent to retain custody or to regain
custody from a nonparent constitute third-party custody cases in
every state." How the case arises, who may bring it, and which
court must hear the case are all considerations with significant
impact. The resolution of these issues is a function of each
state's rules regarding the subject matter jurisdiction of its vari-
ous courts, the standing of nonparents to initiate custody cases,
and the range of other types of child protection provisions avail-
able.8 Cases involving claims of parental unfitness are most
likely to arise in juvenile court as abuse and neglect proceed-
ings. Some states also have a separate guardianship process. 9
There may be a choice of several remedies for any given family
dilemma." Where such overlap occurs, courts and legislatures
must consider the consequences of a lack of uniform procedures
and standards, including the potential for forum-shopping.9
STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1995).
83. See, e.g., McCubbins v. Dawson, 743 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
84. See, e.g., Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907, 915 (Conn. 1989).
85. See, e.g., Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). A higher stan-
dard of proof increases the amount of evidence required to rebut the presumption
and thus the chance that the parent will prevail.
86. See, e.g., Perez, 561 A.2d at 915; Comer v. Comer, 300 S.E.2d 457 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1983).
87. For example, a nonparent seeking custody in Connecticut must file a guard-
ianship petition in Probate Court. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-614 (West 1993).
He may also seek custody in Superior Court by intervening in a pending action
between the parents. Id. § 46b-57.
88. Virtually every state has a child protection agency and juvenile court proce-
dures for identifying children at risk of harm, removing them from their parents
when necessary, and placing them in foster care. See, e.g., id. §§ 17a-90 to -113.
89. See id. §§ 45a-603 to -624; UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-209, 8 U.L.A. 518 (1969).
90. Practitioners must be familiar with the range of possibilities in the state in
which they practice. Because of the wide variation in family law provisions among
the states, an attorney takes a risk if she follows precedent from other states' cases
without making a careful review in her own state.
91. For a detailed discussion of these issues in Connecticut, see Carolyn Wilkes
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2. Distinguishing Between Removal and Reunification Cases
Most states apply the same standards in removal and all
variations of reunification cases.92 Judges too often borrow lan-
guage and reasoning from one type of case to the other without
analyzing the differences between them.93 Yet the equities are
vastly different. An approach that may make sense in one con-
text may be entirely inappropriate in the other.
When the issue is whether to remove a child from the care of
her parent, a "parental rights" stance, focusing only on the fit-
ness of the parent, is reasonable. In some reunification cases,
however, that same approach can lead to results that are unnec-
essarily callous and harmful to the child's interests. Returning a
child to a parent who is a virtual stranger to the child just be-
cause the parent is fit ignores the reality of the child's life and
all other competing factors.94 Conversely, a best interests test
may, arguably, be the appropriate standard in some reunifica-
tion cases, but it can lead to absurdly unfair results in a remov-
al situation. If the court compares the parenting skills or finan-
cial resources of the competing custodians, parents will risk
losing custody of children for reasons that would form a com-
pletely inadequate basis for placing a child in foster care, for
example. Parents of lower socioeconomic status are at particular
risk if courts apply the best interests test in a removal case.
Some jurisdictions do distinguish between removal and reuni-
fication cases. In New Jersey, the courts have recognized the
differences between removal and reunification and thus have
Kaas, Determining Detriment to the Child in Third-Party Custody Cases in Connecti-
cut, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 205 (1995).
92. For example, Connecticut has one statutory standard that applies in both re-
moval and reunification cases. Kansas had a separate test for reunification cases
until the state supreme court overruled In re Criqui, 798 P.2d 69 (Kan. Ct. App.
1990), and reaffirmed a parental preference doctrine in all third-party custody cases,
In re Williams, 869 P.2d 661 (Kan. 1994).
93. O'Keefe analyzes a series of Arkansas cases to demonstrate how courts can
misapply concepts and quote them out of context. O'Keefe, supra note 17, at 1090-92.
94. See Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en banc) (declining to return a
preteen girl to her father). But cf In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.),
stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1, and 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993) (returning a toddler to parents
whom she had never met).
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created a separate test for each situation. 5 A New Jersey ap-
peals court has construed a removal ease as equivalent to a ter-
mination of parental rights proceeding and required the use of a
fitness standard." For reunification cases, the court has adopt-
ed a best interests comparison test.97
Some states have adopted an approach that carves out only
certain types of reunification cases for different treatment.
Those states have a strong preference for the parent, but the
preference disappears completely under certain circumstanc-
es.98 If the parent has abandoned the child to a nonparent,99
or if the court has previously removed the child because of the
parent's unfitness, the court applies a best interests test.'00
This approach suggests that certain kinds of conduct serve as a
waiver of parental rights. The parent at "fault" for the separa-
tion no longer deserves a preference.
Another approach requires courts to distinguish between the
two categories of cases through the application of standing rules.
Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,' a nonparent
has no standing to bring a third-party custody case unless the
child is not living with her parent.0 2 In jurisdictions that have
adopted this rule, there can be no third-party removal cases. If
the nonparent has standing because the child is not residing
with the parent, the court decides the case under the same best
interests test applied in parent-versus-parent cases.' If the
child is living with her parent, the nonparent may not initiate a
custody proceeding." 4 Instead, the nonparent is limited to the
95. Zack v. Fiebert, 563 A.2d 58, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
96. Id. at 59, 63.
97. Id. at 63.
98. Alabama is an example of such a jurisdiction. See AIA CODE § 26-18-7(b)
(1992).
99. Not every voluntary placement with a nonparent is an abandonment. If the
parent has remained in contact with the child and contributed financially to her
support, no court would find such a situation to constitute abandonment.
100. Ex parte Terry, 494 So. 2d 628 (Ala. 1986).
101. Eight states have adopted the custody provisions of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act and thus have this same approach. They are Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington.
102. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 550 (1973).
103. Id. § 401 cmt.
104. Id.
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procedures and the much stricter standards of the Uniform Ju-
venile Court Act."' OneIllinois court has acknowledged that
the purpose and effect of this approach is to protect the superior
rights of the natural parent."' Only nonparents with standing
may compete for custody without having to establish the
parents' unfitness.
10 7
Yet another method of distinguishing between the two types
of cases creates a preference for maintaining the status quo.
Professor Richards recommends that courts recognize a pre-
sumption in favor of the parent, but she redefines "parent" to
include anyone currently acting as the child's current caretak-
er.0 8 Under her approach, the courts must have a signifi-
cant reason for moving a child, regardless of the parental
status of the person with whom she is living.0 9 This ap-
proach is a variation of the statutorily prescribed test in Ha-
waii." O The Hawaii custody statute provides that the court
must decide removal cases on the basis of the child's best
interests but establishes a presumption in favor of the
105. Under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, a "deprived child" means a child who:
(i) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as
required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, men-
tal, or emotional health, or morals, and the deprivation is not due pri-
marily to the lack of financial means of his parents, guardian, or other
custodian;
(ii) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law; or
(iii) has been abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other custodian.
UNIF. JUV. CT. ACT § 2(5), 9A U.L.A. 6 (1968) (providing two alternative definitions).
Once the court finds a child deprived, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence,
it may permit the child to stay with his parents, guardians, or custodians under any
conditions that the court prescribes or may transfer temporary custody to any appro-
priate person or agency. Id. §§ 30, 47. Such an order continues in force for two
years. Id. § 36(c).
106. In re Carey, 544 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
107. Id.
108. The proposed legislation includes this definition: "For purposes of determining
custody, 'parent' includes natural parents, adoptive parents and other persons who
have acted as a parent to the child and who have established a parent-child bond.
Persons receiving money for their services to the child may not be considered par-
ents." Richards, supra note 4, at 765. This definition would exclude a foster parent,
regardless of a close bond between the child and the foster parent.
109. Id. at 764.
110. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (Supp. 1992).
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nonparent in reunification cases."'
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN FORMULATING A
STANDARD
The United States Supreme Court has never prescribed the
standard by which state courts must decide a custody dispute
between a parent and a nonparent."2 It has, however, consid-
ered numerous cases involving parents that defined the rights
of parents, foster parents, and children.' These cases sug-
gest that it is constitutionally permissible for a state to prefer
parents in both removal and reunification third-party custody
disputes."
A. The Rights of the Parties
1. The Rights of Parents
At the root of the constitutional protection of parents' rights
are two types of interests: the broad interest of each family
member in insulating the family from outside intervention.
111. Id.
112. The Supreme Court recently declined to decide such a case. In re Baby Girl
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1, and 114 S. Ct. 11
(1993).
113. Initially, the Supreme Court cases appear inconsistent regarding the primacy
of any one of the factors. Constitutional scholars may track the opinions in terms of
shifting membership of the Court. An equally viable approach, however, focuses on
the role of the Court and the process by which it "makes law." The Court is not a
legislature free to state its view of the best approach in terms of social policy. Rath-
er, the Court must react only to actual "cases and controversies" that parties bring
to it. In those cases, the Court rules on the constitutionality of the state legislative
action or judicial holding that happens to be before it. The results take on a sem-
blance of rationality when viewed merely as sporadic road signs, marking only the
outer limits of what states can do.
114. Various courts and commentators have addressed the constitutionality of all
three standards for third-party custody cases. Compare Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630
P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1981) (declaring the best interests test unconstitutional), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982) with Haynie, supra note 19, at 736 (arguing that only the
best interests test is constitutional).
115. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (acknowledging a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter"); Developments, supra note 65, at
1313. The child also has an interest in protecting her family from attack, as long as
the family is capable of caring for her. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760
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and the interest of "the parent in protecting his or her relation-
ship with and authority over the child.""6 Maintaining the in-
tegrity of the family also furthers the interests of the child.17
Any analysis of parental rights is actually a consideration of the
scope of the protection afforded to the parent-child relation-
ship." Although the State has an interest in protecting chil-
dren by whatever means necessary, including removing them
from their parents,"' it also has an interest in protecting fami-
ly autonomy. This state interest converges with that of the fam-
ily itself because autonomy enhances "warm, enduring and im-
portant" familial bonds ° and ensures childrearing.'2'
The first Supreme Court cases to hold that parent-child rela-
tionships have the status of a fundamental liberty did so in the
context of challenges to state interference with intact nuclear
families. In Meyer v. Nebraska,'22 the Court struck down a
statute that forbade the teaching of foreign languages to chil-
dren, holding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution give parents the liberty and the right
to "marry, establish a home and bring up children."' This
right includes the freedom of parents to control their children's
(1982).
116. Developments, supra note 65, at 1313 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)).
117. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760.
118. Traditionally, the law has accorded the family special treatment, considering it
a unit, not just a collection of individuals. Dolgin, supra note 5, at 1537-46.
119. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67.
120. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); Developments, supra note 65, at
1313-14.
121. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that the parents'
"primary function and freedom include preparation [of the child] for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder"). However, the State sometimes must initiate
intervention in a dysfunctional family, such as in the case of child abuse or neglect.
See id. at 167 ("[Tlhe state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom
and authority in things affecting the child's welfare. . . ."). Further, family members
often invite the State to step in when divorce fractures the family unit.
122. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
123. Id. at 399.
19961 THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY 1073
education.'24 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'25 the Court em-
ployed similar reasoning to invalidate an Oregon law requiring
children to attend public school.'
Two decades later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,"17 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the right to marriage and procreation is
"one of the basic civil rights of man."2 ' In Prince v. Massa-
chusetts,'29 the Court echoed that concept, holding that the
right of "custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents."'
Although the Court first identified the rights articulated in
Skinner and Prince as rights of intact, traditional families, more
recent decisions indicate that these rights inhere in individuals
as well.'' These cases extend the reasoning of the earlier cases
124. Id. at 399-403; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding that
a compulsory school attendance clause violated the free exercise rights of a religious
minority).
125. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
126. Id. at 534-35. Meyer and Pierce form the beginning of the Court's recognition
that the "ultimate basis of protection" of individual and family rights "is the doctrine
of substantive due process." Developments, supra note 65, at 1162. These two cases
were "decided at a time when the due process clauses were thought to provide sub-
stantive protection for a broad panoply of rights" that no longer receive such pro-
tection. Id. However, the Court has expanded, not abandoned, the rights established
in Meyer and Pierce. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
127. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
128. Id. at 541. Skinner involved a statute requiring sterilization of certain convict-
ed felons. Id. at 536-37. Although an equal protection case, Skinner further defined
the scope of the rights that the Court deemed constitutionally protected. Id. at 541.
129. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
130. Id. at 166. The Court upheld the conviction of a guardian for violating child
labor laws by allowing a ward to distribute religious literature. Id. at 171. The
Court noted that the right of a parent to give a child religious training and to en-
courage religious belief deserves protection. Id. at 165-66. The parental figure was
the child's aunt and legal guardian. Id. at 159. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), the Court continued its protection of the fundamental nature of family
and marital privacy by finding unconstitutional a state statute forbidding the use of
contraceptives, id. at 485; see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the
right to marry is fundamental); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(same). One commentator has suggested, however, that the Supreme Court has
equivocated on the issue of whether parental rights enjoy "fundamental rights" sta-
tus or are simply "ordinary" rights. Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitu-
tional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 985-92 (1988).
131. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down on equal
protection grounds a state law barring the sale or gift of contraceptives to unmar-
ried people); see also Developments, supra note 65, at 1164 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
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and recognize that individual parents and extended families
enjoy some protection of their rights. 3'
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided a series of
cases involving the rights of unwed fathers, defined the standard
for terminating parental rights, and considered whether the
Constitution protects the rights of foster families. 3 3 These lat-
er cases illuminate the extent to which the biological basis or
status of parenthood triggers constitutional protection.
Stanley v. Illinois3 1 was the first decision in a line of unwed
father cases. Courts often cite Stanley for the broad principle
that a parent's interest in having an ongoing relationship with
his child "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.' 35 This language seemed to
invite its citation as support for a strong "parental rights"
stance. Subsequent cases, however, have narrowed this inter-
pretation. 136 Careful attention to the factual context of the case
thus becomes important.
Mr. Stanley was the natural father of three children.'37 Al-
though not married to the children's mother, he had lived inter-
mittently with her and the children for eighteen years.138 After
the mother died, the State removed the children from the father,
without a hearing, and placed them in foster care, all under
U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a woman's right to an abortion)). Although Eisenstadt
looked like an incremental extension of the Griswold holding, it was in fact a very
significant change in direction. Griswold indicated that the family was a separate
entity with its own zone of privacy. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. The Court in
Eisenstadt defined the family as nothing more than a group of individuals with their
own autonomous rights. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The opinion has been called
.revolutionary" in its treatment of the family, considered an entity with rights sepa-
rate from those of its individual members since feudal times. Dolgin, supra note 5,
at 1545-46.
132. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (reaffirming
Eisenstadt's holding that individuals also have a right to procreative choice); Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a grandmother and two
grandsons who were cousins were a "family" with a fundamental right to privacy
sufficient to invalidate a restrictive zoning ordinance).
133. See infra notes 134-96 and accompanying text.
134. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
135. Id. at 651.
136. See infra notes 141-77 and accompanying text.
137. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
138. Id.
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color of state law that presumed an unwed father unfit to care
for his children.'39 Mr. Stanley challenged the state law as a
denial of equal protection. The Supreme Court agreed, conclud-
ing that an unmarried family unit often enjoyed just as strong a
bond as a family within a formal marriage and holding that an
unwed father's fundamental right to care for his children was no
different from that of a mother or divorced father."'
The subsequent cases of Quilloin v. Walcott,' Caban v. Mo-
hammed,' and Lehr v. Robertson.. helped to define the lim-
its of the constitutional protection afforded biological parents.
All three cases involved unwed fathers attempting to block or
vacate the adoption of their children by the husbands of the
children's mothers. 44 Each of the three fathers faced termina-
tion of his parental rights,'45 the most severe and irrevocable
of all actions that a state can take against a parent. Significant-
ly, in all three cases, the children would have remained in the
care of their mothers whether or not the courts terminated the
fathers' rights. "
In the Quilloin opinion, written by Justice Marshall, the
Court held that the Constitution would not permit Georgia to
use a best interests test when deciding whether to allow the
adoption of a child over her father's objection.'47 The Court dis-
tinguished Stanley because Mr. Quilloin had never exercised any
parental responsibility and because the adoption would not dis-
rupt an existing family." 8 Use of the best interests test would
have given the father the opportunity to be heard, but because,
unlike Mr. Stanley, he had not taken the opportunity to estab-
139. Id. at 646-47.
140. Id. at 651-59.
141. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
142. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
143. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
144. Id. at 250; Caban, 441 U.S. at 382-83; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
145. Caban, 441 U.S. at 383-84; see Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
146. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264 n.22; Caban, 441 U.S. at 383-94; Quilloin, 434 U.S.
at 256.
147. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254-55.
148. Id. at 255. The mother and child were not living with the father. Rather, the
child already had been living with his mother and his stepfather for more than six
years. Id. at 247.
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lish an actual relationship with his child, the Court concluded that
his biological relationship did not warrant that protection. "9
A year later, in Caban, a five-member majority of the Court
agreed with the father's equal protection challenge to a New York
statute allowing unwed mothers, but not fathers, to withhold con-
sent to an adoption.150 The statutory schemes in Quilloin and
Caban operated in a similar manner.'5 ' The key fact that
seemed to account for the difference in the results of these two
cases was that Mr. Caban, like Mr. Stanley, had already estab-
lished a substantial relationship with his children. 5'
In Lehr, the Court again emphasized the actual relationship
between the parent and the child as a significant factor.' 5 ' The
Court denied Mr. Lehr's claim that New York's adoption law
violated his rights to due process and equal protection."' The
law did not provide all unwed fathers with notice of the adoption
of his child by the mother's husband.'55 Because Lehr and
Stanley both involved challenges to statutes that failed to give
notice to unwed fathers, their factual differences lie in stark
contrast."6 In a decision written by Justice Stevens, the six-
member majority in Lehr focused on the failure of the father to
support financially or to form a relationship with his child.157
The "intangible fibers that connect parent and child" are evi-
dently only "sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection
in appropriate cases.""5
The overwhelming message from this quartet of cases is that
the right of a parent to a relationship with his children is very
important, but not absolute. The Court seems to have taken the
149. Id. at 256.
150. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
151. Id. at 385; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248.
152. Caban, 441 U.S. at 393-94. The father had shared joint custody with the
mother for several years. See id. at 382.
153. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-63 (1983).
154. Id. at 265, 268.
155. Id. at 251-52.
156. The fact that Mr. Lehr's child was only two years old when the mother's hus-
band adopted the child, id. at 250, illustrates the full extent to which the Court in
Lehr actually retreated from the position taken in Stanley. The Court's opinion thus
denied Mr. Lehr the chance to develop a relationship.
157. Id. at 261-63.
158. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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position that protecting the rights of natural parents is appro-
priate only when they have undertaken their corollary parental
responsibilities.'59 These cases appear to establish the rule
that the Constitution will protect all biological parent-child rela-
tionships as long as they also involve the exercise of responsi-
bility and the existence of actual psychological ties.6 °
However, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 6' yet another case in-
volving the rights of a father not married to his child's mother,
the Supreme Court suggested that, under certain circumstances,
a close relationship and commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood are not enough to protect the rights of the
parent.'62 The status of the legal relationship between the par-
ents is also a factor in defining the scope of constitutional pro-
tection.'63 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. ech-
oed the Court's earlier decisions' recognizing that the root of
parental rights is the interest of the family unit in remaining
intact.'65
159. The Court does not protect biological links alone or even inchoate relation-
ships. "Parental rights do not spring full blown from the biological connection be-
tween parent and child. They require relationships more enduring." Id. at 260 (quot-
ing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). This
position is consistent with Professor Bartletts recommendation that courts should
decide which party will prevail not on the basis of biology, property, or exchange
theories, but rather in a manner that gives priority to demonstrated responsibility
and commitment. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 336.
160. Justice Brennan found that the theme of these four cases was that a biological
link between father and child coupled with a substantial parent-child relationship
will guarantee constitutional protection. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142-
43 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This "commitment [to the responsibilities] of par-
enthood . . . is why Mr. Stanley and Mr. Caban won; [and] why Mr. Quilloin and
Mr. Lehr lost .... " Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. 491 U.S. 110.
162. Id. at 123-24.
163. Id.
164. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978).
165. In effect, this opinion represents a return to the premise that family units,
not only the individuals in them, possess rights. See supra notes 99-106 and accom-
panying text. One commentator suggests that this opinion inadvertantly succeeds in
viewing the dispute through the child's eyes by assuming that the child needs and
wants an intact family more than a second father. Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching
the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747,
1858 (1993). Professor Woodhouse's conclusion comes more from the real-life sequel
to the story than from the formal positions of the parties during the litigation. She
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In Michael H., the Supreme Court let stand a California law
creating the presumption that a child born to a married woman
cohabitating with her husband is the husband's child.'66 The
child's mother had engaged in an extramarital affair.6 7 Blood
tests confirmed to a ninety-eight percent probability that her
lover was the biological father of the child born to her during
her marriage.16 The mother and the child lived intermittently
with the husband and with the biological father, and the child
had a caring relationship with both men.'69 When the mother
and her husband reconciled, the mother rebuffed the biological
father's attempts to continue visiting with the child."'v When
he pursued the matter in court, the California law denied him
the opportunity to establish his paternity, 7' and the court de-
nied his request for visitation.'72 The Supreme Court found no
constitutional infirmity in these actions."'
The foregoing group of five cases illustrates that, for the Con-
stitution to protect the rights of parents, biology alone is not
enough. "[Parental rights are not solely a function of one's sta-
tus as a genetic progenitor." 74 These cases also show that a
close, responsible relationship between parent and child is im-
portant but not necessarily determinative when recognition of
their relationship would erode an existing family unit that in-
cludes the other parent."' The Supreme Court has sent the
reports that Mr. H. has continued to try to contact his daughter, who now regards
him as the "crazy man from California who thinks he's my father." Id. at 1865.
166. The law allowed the mother or her husband to challenge the child's paternity
but did not give such a right to the outsider, the biological father. Michael H., 491
U.S. at 115 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1989)). After this deci-
sion, the California legislature amended its statute to allow a putative father to
rebut the presumption that the mother's husband had fathered the child by bringing
a motion within two years of the child's birth. Dolgin, supra note 5, at 1569-70.
167. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.
168. Id. at 114.
169. Id. The child called her biological father "Daddy," and he had contributed to
her support. Id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 114.
171. Id. at 115.
172. Id. at 115-16.
173. Id. at 132.
174. Hill, supra note 6, at 380.
175. The presence of the other parent allows the Constitution to bow out of the
equation. The Court takes the position that the custodial parent knows what is best
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message that jurisdictions have significant latitude in protecting
the existing functional or "unitary" family' 6 from external at-
tack, at least when one of the child's parents is a member of
that family.
177
States, however, may not ignore all genetic ties between par-
ent and child.' 8 The Court has continued to take a very firm
stand in protecting the rights of natural parents, especially
when the family involved is no longer intact because the parents
have had trouble living up to their responsibilities. In Santosky
v. Kramer,179 a New York judge terminated the rights of both
parents of several children, finding that the State had proven by
a preponderance of the evidence that the children were "perma-
nently neglected."80 The Supreme Court 8' held that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard was insufficient and that a
state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence before
terminating parental rights.8 2 In an opinion written by Justice
Blackmun, the five-member majority observed that the "funda-
mental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody
and management of their child does not evaporate simply be-
cause they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State."'83 The Santosky opinion al-
so stressed that the purpose of a termination proceeding is not
for the child. Thus, the Court will not prevent the custodial parent from obliterating
the child's relationship with the other parent.
176. The plurality opinion in Michael H. purports to dismiss the idea that the
mother's marriage to her husband gives the relationship protection. Michael H., 491
U.S. at 128-30. Justice Brennan points out in his dissent, however, that nothing else
can reconcile the result in Michael H. with the other four unwed father cases. Id. at
142-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The unwed father in Michael H. had the same
close, loving, and responsible relationship with his child that the other cases found
key. Id.
177. If faced with a challenge to a state law that allowed a putative natural father
to rebut the presumption that the mother's husband is the legal father, the Court
most likely would let such a law stand. Hill, supra note 6, at 380-81.
178. See supra notes 134-40, 160 and accompanying text.
179. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
180. Id. at 747-52.
181. The Court stressed the irrevocability of the state action, the high risk of error,
and the ability of the State to shape the nature of the relationship between the
parent and the child once the child is in foster placement. Id. at 763-66.
182. Id. at 769-70.
183. Id. at 753.
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to compare whether the natural parent or the foster parent can
provide the better home.'"
The message of Santosky is that biology and a previous rela-
tionship still trigger significant protection, even when only tenu-
ously linked to a once intact family. The outcome in that case
also suggests that, when court action would sever the link be-
tween the child and both parents, placing her in a new home
with neither parent, the parents' interests are due the highest
protection.
2. The Rights of Nonparents
As a further piece in the mosaic, the Court also has made
clear the limits of constitutional protection for developed, emo-
tional relationships between an adult and a child in the absence
of biological or adoptive ties. In Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform,'85 foster families challenged
the constitutionality of New York statutes that allowed the State
to remove foster children from their homes without a full adver-
sarial hearing. 8 The plaintiffs argued that the foster family
was a psychological family and thus had a liberty interest in
maintaining itself as a family unit."7 The Court disagreed"
and upheld the statutes by a six-to-three vote.'89 The majority
did acknowledge that a family is not defined solely by "the fact
of blood relationship,"' noting that the importance of a famil-
ial relationship "stems from the emotional attachments that
184. Id. at 759. The benefits of a foster parent's home are only a permissible con-
sideration at the later dispositional phase of the case. Id. at 761.
185. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
186. Id. at 823-33.
187. Id. at 839.
188. The Court's precise holding was that the procedural due process that the New
York statutes afforded the foster families was sufficient even if the foster family had
a constitutionally protected family privacy interest. Id. at 847-56. Justice Stewart
concurred in the result but took a firm position that foster families had no such
interest. Id. at 857-58 (Stewart, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 856. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion, id. at 818, and three members
of the Court concurred, id. at 856 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Rehnquist, J.).
190. Id. at 844.
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derive from the intimacy of daily association.""' However, the
Court justified its decision to uphold the statute by emphasizing
the State as the contractual source of the foster family relation-
ship.'92 In contrast, the biological family's liberty interest de-
rives from intrinsic human rights, not state law.'93 The majori-
ty in Smith also asserted that the biological family's right to
reunification weakened any right of the foster family to remain
together.9 '
The Smith majority opinion demonstrates that parental status
and biological ties continue to play a major role in the consti-
tutional rights analysis. The Court does not define the family
solely in terms of how it functions on a daily basis. Indeed, the
Court has only allowed the rights of a family other than the
original family to subordinate the interests of a natural parent
when the second family includes the other natural parent.'95
The constitutional protection of the family reaches its peak
when the child is at risk of losing all connection to her biological
family. At that point, the Court stresses the importance and
intrinsic nature of the biological relationship between parent
and child.'96
191. Id.
192. Id. at 845; see also id. at 863 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The family life upon
which the State 'intrudes' is simply a temporary status which the State itself has
created.").
193. Id. at 845-46; see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(emphasizing the natural order of extended families).
194. The Court stated that, even if foster families have some rights sufficient to
trigger procedural due process protections, they do not necessarily have substantive
fundamental rights equal to those of biological parents. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846-47.
The Court left open the issue of whether the Constitution protects the first foster
family against a child's removal to a second foster family. The Justices did not criti-
cize the State's practice of removing children when the foster parents became too
emotionally attached to them. See id. at 836 n.40. The Court also did not reject the
State's avowed intention for foster homes to provide a transitional arrangement,
leading either to the reunion of the child with her natural parents or to the child's
transfer to a permanent adoptive home. Id. at 833-38.
195. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
196. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
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3. The Rights of Children
Despite social scientists' pleas that courts act solely in the
child's interests,"s7 remarkably few cases recognize broad, indi-
vidual rights of children independent of their rights as members
of families.19 The Supreme Court has recognized children's
rights against the State and other outsiders 9 more readily
than it has found that children have a right to act in direct
conflict with their parents' wishes."0
197. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(rev. ed. 1979).
198. See Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 AD.:
Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHiO N.U. L. REv. 543, 547-
49 (1991). Although some change has occurred in the way that the Court describes
the rights of adult family members, the same evolution has not taken place in the
discussion of children's rights. Dolgin, supra note 5, at 1561. The Court now de-
scribes adult family members as a collection of individuals, id. at 1560-61, but still
discusses the rights of children in terms of the relationship between adult and child,
treating the family as a unit, Gill, supra, at 548.
199. In the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court cited past authority
indicating that a child is a person for the purposes of deciding the extent of certain
constitutional protections, id. at 13 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601
(1948)). The Court in Gault awarded due process protection to juveniles. Id. at 33-
57. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), the Court held that students have a First Amendment right to free expres-
sion, id. at 506. The Court declared unconstitutional a school regulation prohibiting
the wearing of armbands to protest the Vietnam war. Id. at 514. In Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court found that minors have
the right to contraceptives, similar to the right of adults, id. at 693-94.
200. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court ruled un-
constitutional a Missouri law requiring minors to obtain parental permission for
abortions during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, id. at 72-75. However, later cases
demonstrate that minors' liberty and privacy rights are not absolute. States may
place reasonable restrictions on a minor's right to an abortion by requiring parental
notice and consent if they provide judicial bypass procedures and other safeguards.
See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510-19 (1990)
(upholding the constitutionality of an Ohio statute preventing a physician from per-
forming an abortion on an unmarried dependent minor without first providing notice
to the minor's parents); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 496-97 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute's 48-hour waiting period
following parental notification); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 505
(1983) (plurality opinion) (upholding the constitutionality of a provision requiring
parental or judicial consent); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-13 (1981) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of a Utah law requiring physicians to notify the parents of
a minor seeking an abortion, if possible). But see, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 633-39 (1979) (striking down a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent
due to the lack of a judicial bypass option).
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The Supreme Court has not recognized an independent right
of children to maintain a relationship with any party other than
the reciprocal right to a relationship with the biological par-
ent.2"' The majority in Smith recognized that for the child, the
foster family may "hold the same place in the emotional life of
the child as [the] natural family,"0 2 but the Court did not find
that this reality gave the child any right to remain with her
psychological family at the expense of her parent's right to re-
unification with his child.13 The child has so few independent
rights that even when she wishes to maintain a relationship
with one of her biological parents, her right to do so may be
subordinated to the interests of the adults and the interest of
the State in preserving her other parent's family unit. In Mi-
chael H., the daughter raised due process and equal protection
arguments that she had the right to a continuing relationship
with both her biological father and her mother's husband, pre-
sumed by law to be her father.20 4 The Court rejected both argu-
ments, finding that no child had a right to multiple fathers
0 5
and that the State had a rational basis for refusing to allow a
child to rebut the presumption of her own legitimacy.0 ' Fur-
ther, although the State has the right to intervene in a family to
protect a child, the child does not have a reciprocal right of a
In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court refused to declare unconstitu-
tional procedures that allowed a parent to commit his child to a mental institution
without a full adversarial hearing, id. at 620-21. The Court reaffirmed that a parent
presumably acts in his child's best interests. Id. at 602. The Court's ruling indicates
that it did not equate the parent's action with the state action for which Gault
required due process safeguards.
201. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431
U.S. 816 (1977).
202. Id. at 844.
203. The theory that a child has an interest in being with her natural parent is so
well-accepted that the court-appointed lawyers for the foster children in Smith did
not argue that the children had a right to remain with their "psychological" families.
See id. at 839. The children's counsel instead opposed the foster parents' requests for
additional hearings prior to removal. Id. The Supreme Court overturned the district
court's finding that the foster child, not the foster parent, has the right to a hearing
before suffering the "grievous loss" of the foster family. Id. at 840.
204. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116 (1989).
205. Id. at 130-31.
206. Because the mother and the husband had regained harmony in their marriage,
the State had a rational basis for choosing to protect that union. Id.
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guarantee of safety and may not sue the State for failing to
protect her."7 Children thus do not even have an absolute
right to safety from abuse."'
B. Implications for Third-Party Custody Cases
The interests at stake in a third-party custody case have
much more in common with the issues addressed in Stanley,
Santosky, and Smith than with the questions posed by the other
unwed father cases. Most third-party custody cases do not pres-
ent the issue of whether the wishes of one biological parent to
bring the child into the parent's new family and sever the daily
link with the other parent can override the rights of the other
parent."9 Rather, most types of removal and reunification cas-
es involve situations in which the bond between the child and
her one remaining parent or both of her parents is at risk.210 If
207. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189, 201 (1989), the Court refused to find that the State has a constitutional duty
to guarantee a child's safety. That case involved a child who was not removed
from his father's home, despite clear signs of abuse. Id. at 191-93. After the child
sustained permanent brain damage requiring institutionalization, his mother
brought suit. Id. at 193. The Court would not recognize a cause of action, holding
that the Constitution did not affirmatively require the defendant to protect the
child. Id. at 197.
208. The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case like Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623
So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), appeal denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1994). In
Kingsley, a Florida boy sought to have his parents' rights terminated so that his
foster parents could adopt him. The Florida trial court found that the child had the
capacity to initiate the termination proceeding, but an appellate court reversed the
decision. Id. at 783. Because other parties to the action had filed separate termina-
tion petitions, the error was harmless. Id. at 785.
This case was not as revolutionary as the popular press made it seem. See, e.g.,
Helene Cooper, Judge Is Asked If Children Have Right To Sue on Their Own Behalf,
WALL ST. J., June 17, 1992, at B10. The only novel aspect was that the child initi-
ated the action, seeking a court determination of the traditional concepts -of parental
fitness. The case did not raise any new issues regarding the right of a child to
choose a nonparent over the objection of a fit parent. Dolgin, supra note 5, at 1564
n.208.
209. Such a severance was one of the main issues in Michael H., 491 U.S. 110;
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
210. In Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en banc), one parent sought to
reestablish his bond, id. at 118. In In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649
(Mich.), stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1 and 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993), both parents united in
their attempt to regain custody of their child from nonparents, id. at 650-51.
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the nonparent prevails, the court will place or leave the child
with a new family group that does not include either parent.
Third-party custody cases thus usually invoke the strongest
right of parents to continue their relationship with their chil-
dren. This fundamental right requires the State to adopt stan-
dards for third-party custody cases that protect the relationship
between parent and child. Even if strongly attached to the child,
the nonparent has no right even close to the right of the parent.
Similarly, the child has no independent right to remain with the
nonparent.
Although third-party custody cases do not require courts to
make decisions that will dissolve forever the legal bond between
parent and child,"' they nonetheless require states"2 to wres-
tle with all of the competing factors identified in termination
cases. Removing custody from a parent is a very serious step. It
"destroys any pretense of a normal parent-child relationship and
eliminates nearly all of the natural incidents of parenthood
including the everyday care and nurturing which are part and
parcel of the bond between parent and child."1 3 Losing custody
often reduces the parent to nothing more than a court-sanc-
tioned visitor in the child's life. 4 Recognizing this effect, sev-
eral courts have equated a parent's loss of custody of his child to
a nonparent with the termination of a parent's rights."
1. Removal Cases
If the standard for deciding a removal case is a best-interests-
of-the-child test, the court is free to compare all aspects of the
environments that the competing custodians have to offer.'
211. Custody decisions are not irrevocable, and the noncustodial parent most likely
will retain the right to visit the child. See, e.g., In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d
246, 255 (Colo. 1995).
212. A state acts through its legislature, its courts, or both. JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 452 (4th ed. 1991).
213. Zack v. Fiebert, 563 A.2d 58, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
214. In fact, the parent can become almost an intruder. Barstad v. Frazier, 348
N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. 1984).
215. Zack, 563 A.2d at 63; Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 483.
216. See 1 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION
CASES § 4.06, at 226-27 (2d ed. 1993).
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Neither adult -comes to the case with an advantage.217 A judge
may well conclude that it is "best" for a child to have the biggest
home or the best school or to live with the most well-educated
adult, regardless of whether the child is really in any danger at
home or whether the parent is incapable of caring adequately for
the child.
In the usual removal cases,21 the nonparent seeking custody
is not a member of the same nuclear family as are the parent
and the child.219 When establishing the decisional standards
for these removal cases, legislatures and courts must recognize
that the family is intact.22 The interests of the child and the
parent to remain together continue to converge until the point at
which the child is not safe at home.
A best interests test that allows removal for a lesser reason
and ignores any advantage to the parent is unconstitutional
because it fails to give sufficient weight to the interests of family
integrity.22" ' Affirming the right of intact, albeit imperfect, fam-
ilies to stay together, Justice Stewart has concluded that
[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural
family, over the objections of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason
that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest,
I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded
impermissibly on "the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter." 2
217. See statutes cited supra note 78.
218. When the nonparent seeking custody of the child is not an "outsider" to the
child's nuclear family, the constitutional protections do not apply. See 1 HARALAMBIE,
supra note 216, § 10.03, at 539. No intact family is at risk of intrusion and thus no
deference of a constitutional magnitude is required.
219. In Schult v. Schult, No. FA-91-03-50-59S, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 429
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 1994), the maternal grandmother intervened in the
parents' divorce action to seek custody. She had not lived with either parent and
child as a family unit prior to the three-way custody battle. See also Martin v.
Sand, 444 A.2d 309 (Del. Faro. Ct. 1982) (involving a custody dispute between the
child's babysitter and both of his parents).
220. A family entitled to constitutional protection exists so long as one parent and
one child reside together. See 1 HARALAMBIE, supra note 216, § 10.12, at 551-53.
221. Haynie posits that the best interests test is constitutional. Haynie, supra note
19, at 742-43. However, her article focuses mainly on reunification cases. See, e.g.,
id. at 713.
222. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
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In abuse and neglect cases, the Constitution already requires
courts to balance carefully the need to protect children with the
strong obligation to protect family autonomy.2" The family's
need for significant protection is as high in a removal case as in
any child abuse or neglect case. The fundamental nature of the
rights of the family at stake is the same. In both, an outside
entity seeks to interfere with the parent-child relationship. They
each reduce to the same essential issue: Should the court exer-
cise its parens patriae authority to separate this parent and this
child? It simply does not matter whether the case was initiated
by a child protection agency or a private third party.224
2. Reunification Cases
In all variations of reunification cases, circumstances have
already separated the parent and child.2 5 Their relationship
suffers from a lack of the intimacy of day-to-day contact. The
emotional needs of the parent and the child may very well di-
verge, particularly if the child is fully integrated into the
nonparent's family. The question thus becomes whether this
difference between removal and reunification cases renders the
use of a best interests test constitutional.
In the reunification context, a best interests test would allow
the court to compare all of the attributes of the two custodians
862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944)). Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist joined in the con-
currence. Id. at 856. Although Justice Stewart was speaking in terms of a state-
initiated proceeding, no discernible, significant difference distinguishes cases initiated
by an agent of the State and cases started by private disputants.
223. There is a high degree of tension between the fear of "violat[ing] a family's
integrity before intervention is justified and the fear of... [waiting] until it may be
too late to protect the child whose well-being is threatened." Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, 92 YALE L.J. 219, 226 (1982) (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 133-34 (1979)).
224. The only exception is the aforementioned "special" case, in which the third
party is a member of the child's nuclear family, upon whom one parent has be-
stowed parental status.
225. In Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989), a parent sought to regain custo-
dy from grandparents, id. at 909, while Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en
banc), involved a parent's claim for custody of a child who had been living with her
stepfather for many years, id. at 118.
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and select the one who offers the child the most stable up-
bringing and the most advantages. It would also permit the
court to decide to maintain the status quo solely because the
child is well-cared for and performing well in the nonparent's
home.226
a. "Parental Condition" Cases
For those reunification cases in which the child has been
living with the nonparent due to the parent's incapability, the
best interests test fails to offer sufficient protection to scattered
family members. The test does not start with the premise that
the parent can regain custody if he rehabilitates himself in a
reasonably timely manner. Under the reasoning of Santosky, the
Constitution requires states to offer reasonable protection to the
distressed biological family's right to reunification."7 Although
the Court has not established a parent's absolute right to be
with his child, it has also never endorsed the position that the
parent's rights are so ethereal that a state may deny the reunifi-
cation of the natural family just because the nonparent caretak-
er can do a better job raising the child. As Justice Stevens has
observed, "[n]either [state] law nor federal law authorizes unre-
lated persons to retain custody of a child whose natural parents
have not been found to be unfit simply because they may be
better able to provide for her future and her education."22
Thus, in reunification cases in which the parent's own history of
problems has separated him from his child, a state may not
deny the rehabilitated parent's request for reunification based
simply on the superior parenting capabilities of the nonparent
caretaker.229 Because the best interests test would permit such
a result, it is a constitutionally infirm approach in this context.
226. The best interests test, based on a general policy against disrupting a child's
stability and continuity, is the traditional standard in most modification of custody
actions between two parents. Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child
Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 757 (1985).
227. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982).
228. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 114 S. Ct. 1, 2 (Stevens, J.) (denying application for
stay), stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
229. See Bartlett, supra note 38, at 928. ,
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b. "Second Family" Cases
For the second group of reunification cases, resulting from one
parent's formation of a new family with the child, the constitu-
tional analysis is quite different. The Constitution will probably
permit a state to use the best interests test in this type of case.
The dynamics of these cases bear a strikingly close resemblance
to the interests involved in Michael H. and, to a lesser extent,
the other unwed father cases. The custodial parent has formed a
second family with the child, somewhat at the expense of the
child's relationship with the noncustodial parent.3 0 Following
the absence of the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent
challenges the nonparent, effectively disrupting the family that
the now absent parent created for and shared with the child." 1
As the unwed father cases and Smith illustrate, the Supreme
Court accords heightened status to a parent and child's "second
family," which the absent parent undoubtedly intended as the
child's permanent home. 2 This intended permanence renders
the "second family" far different from a foster parent or other
caretaker, whose purpose was to care for the child temporari-
ly.2 3 As a result, the Constitution does not require a state to
protect the relationship between the child and her noncustodial
parent with any process greater than a best interests analysis.
Neither does the Constitution proscribe the use of a parental
preference for this second group of reunification cases. The un-
wed father cases do not mean that the second family's interests
must, in every case, outweigh the interests of the noncustodial
parent. Rather, the Constitution allows each state a wider range
of choice in selecting the appropriate standard for this category
of cases.
230. For example, in Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en banc), the mother
and child had been living with the child's stepfather for years, id. at 118. The child
knew her biological father only to be a "friend of the family." Id.
231. The death of the custodial parent has not necessarily dissolved that family in
its entirety.
232. See also Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986) (involving a child who
lived with a stepparent after his parent's death and faced a sudden and wrenching
change in residence when his surviving parent sought custody).
233. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
833 (1977).
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IV. CHOOSING THE STANDARD
A. Why the Preference for the Parent?
A standard that prefers the parent is undoubtedly a consti-
tutionally valid approach for a state to choose for resolving both
removal and reunification third-party custody disputes. Of the
three possible approaches," 4 the parental preference is the
most consistent with the Supreme Court's emerging message
that biology is an important, but not the exclusive, mark of
parenthood. 5 The preference standard is the one approach
that allows a court both to recognize and to evaluate the biologi-
cal and emotional ties between a parent and his child without
blinding itself to other factors. A court still may weigh the
parent's level of responsibility and commitment to the child, 6
consider the strength of the emotional bond between the child
and her nonparent caretaker, and evaluate the effect of a custo-
dy change on the child.
In addition to expressing the social policy choice to favor one
candidate for custody over another, preferences also advance the
cause of judicial economy. 7 The existence of a preference
would increase consistency and predictability in custody deci-
sions."' Predictability has the benefit of discouraging the filing
of groundless cases and encouraging the settlement of pending
cases.239 Moreover, a preference would limit the trial judge's
discretion, restraining a decision based on disapproval of a
parent's lifestyle or values."
234. See supra part II.B.1.
235. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843.
236. Professor Bartlett proposes that courts, legislators, and legal scholars "re-direct
the law applicable to disputes over parental status toward a view of parenthood
based on responsibility and connection." Bartlett, supra note 8, at 295. She suggests
that discussions of the issues in terms of competing and individuated rights is inap-
propriate and counterproductive because it encourages possessive and self-centered
behavior in parents. Id. at 294. Instead, she advocates a focus on the parent-child
relationship, which she concludes will reinforce generosity and "other-directedness."
Id.
237. Richards, supra note 4, at 760.
238. Id. at 737.
239. Id. at 760.
240. Id.; see, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (clearly dis-




a. The Classic Case
A preference for the parent in a removal case would reject
explicitly a best interest or comparison approach that starts
with the two adults on equal footing.24' Instead, it begins
with the assumption that the child should remain with the
parent. 2
Constitutional protection of the rights of parents requires
courts to use a preference standard. There are other compelling
reasons as well. The similarity between removal custody cases
and abuse and neglect proceedings is a persuasive basis for
rejecting a best interests approach for removal cases. Cases that
raise the same issues deserve consistent standards. Although an
abuse and neglect case may arise through a procedurally differ-
ent route than a removal case, no logical basis exists for adopt-
ing a standard for removal cases that differs from the test used
in abuse and neglect cases. Without a uniform basis for deciding
when to separate a parent and child, a serious risk of contradic-
tory results arises. In turn, this possibility will lead to forum-
shopping. 4 ' A nonparent should not be able to affect the out-
come of a case by manipulating jurisdiction and dictating the
court in which it will arise.' The parent and child have no
Professor Richards argues that a best interests test in third-party custody cases
is overly broad, but also acknowledges that, in reunification cases, a presumption
approach may be overly restrictive. See Richards, supra note 4, at 760. For a discus-
sion of her recommendation, see infra part IV.B.2.
241. This rule applies in all removal cases except the limited exception identified
infra part II.A.l.b.
242. Richards, supra note 4, at 736.
243. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse, 348 U.S.
437, 456 (1955) (noting that different outcomes may lead to forum-shopping).
244. For example, a nonparent concerned with the safety of a child may choose to
notify a child protection 'agency, triggering an abuse or neglect proceeding. If the
appropriate grounds exist, the State will remove the child from the parent and place
her in foster care. In many states, the State may choose a relative as the foster
parent. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(d) (West Supp. 1995). In some
jurisdictions, a concerned nonparent may initiate a third-party custody case or in-
tervene in a pending custody dispute between two parents. See, e.g., id. § 46b-57.
Because the same concern for the child's safety is at the root of the nonparent's
action, the result-whether or not the court removes the child-should be the same
as in an abuse or neglect proceeding. It may be different, however, if the court de-
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less an interest in remaining together simply because the court
jurisdiction rules allow the nonparent to bring the case in a
court that applies a less stringent standard."
Courts and commentators have advised against using a best
interests test, especially in parent-grandparent disputes:
When a parent is young, the physical, financial and even
emotional factors may often appear to favor the grandpar-
ents. One cannot expect young parents to compete on an
equal level with their established older relatives. So the "best
interest" standard cannot be the test. If it were we would be
forced to conclude that only the more affluent in our society
should raise children. To state the proposition is to demon-
strate its absurdity.24
One commentator has suggested that, even in the early cases
that purport to apply a best interests test, the courts used "in-
nocent sleight-of-hand in juggling legal concepts" to avoid
awarding custody to a nonparent.247 The courts declined to
construe the best interests test as one requiring them to award
custody "to a person other than a parent merely because that
person was of high character, entertained real affection for the
child, or could give the child much greater cultural and educa-
tional advantages (because he had more money) than could the
parents."248
cides the custody case under the best interests standard used in a custody dispute
between two parents.
245. The Santosky decision stresses the unlimited nature of the State's resources as
one basis for adopting an elevated burden of proof in termination proceedings.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982). Similarly, a family member with
greater financial resources than the parent can bankroll a protracted legal battle.
Even a little disparity in resources between the parties can skew the result.
246. Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. 1984); Richards, supra note 4,
at 734-35. Mnookin proposes a hypothetical that also illustrates that the effect of a
best interests test can be unjust. Mnookin, supra note 77, at 257-61.
247. Sayre, supra note 63, at 677 n.33.
248. Id. at 677. The problem with "juggling" to make the case come out "right" is
that such an approach strains the logic of the definitions. A true best interests test
is a comparison test. If courts should not base their choice of nonparents as custodi-
ans solely on the nonparents' ability to offer the child more advantages, then they
should have a rule that rejects a comparison approach outright. Reliance on the
courts to figure out that "best interests" does not really mean that the court should
choose the "best" environment is risky. Policymakers cannot expect judges to turn
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Finally, the preference for the parent in a removal context is
consistent with psychological principles of child development.
The preference embodies the uncontroverted recognition that a
close emotional bond most often develops between a parent and
his child and that the child will suffer psychological harm if the
court removes her from her parent's care. Removal cases re-
quire the court to balance the possibly conflicting needs of the
child: safety, basic physical and emotional care,249 and a con-
tinuous emotional attachment with the parent.' Most psy-
chologists agree that separating a child from her parents cre-
ates psychological pain for the child. Every child needs "unbro-
ken continuity of affectionate and stimulating relationships with
an adult.""' Psychoanalytic theory suggests that, once a child
bonds with her caretaker, separation is very damaging to her
future healthy developmentY2 Consequently, removal is ap-
propriate only in those extreme cases in which it is the "least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's
growth and development.""3
For all these reasons, the preference test is an appropriate
test for a classic removal case. The child never benefits from
removal from a marginal yet adequate home, based simply on
the fact that the nonparent offers a home with more physical
comforts or a more, skillful caretaker. Accepted wisdom holds
that the pain of the separation far outweighs the material ad-
themselves inside out construing the concept so that it means something other than
what it appears to say.
249. The public's interest also requires that children be raised well and in a
healthy environment.
250. "So long as a child is a member of a functioning family, his paramount interest
lies in the preservation of his family." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 223, at 5.
251. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 197, at 6.
252. Other psychological theories similarly stress the importance of parent-child
bonds, but they do not consider separation quite as destructive as psychoanalytic
theories do. For example, supporters of the "attachment theory" suggest that children
can form multiple attachments and that other factors can mitigate the harm of sepa-
ration. Everett Waters & Donna M. Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs. Attachment
Theory: The Child's Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Things for the
Wrong Reasons, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 505, 510-12 (1983-1984).
Nonetheless, psychologists supporting the attachment theory also assert that courts
and social agencies should be very cautious about removing children from their par-
ents. Id. at 513.
253. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 197, at 53.
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vantages that the nonparent can provideY4 Instead, courts
should prefer the parent, granting custody to the nonparent only
when the child's need for safety or basic care leaves the court
with no other alternative.255
b. The Exception to the Rule: The Special Removal Case
In the special type of removal case, the parent and nonparent
have cared for the child together. The parent has consciously
created a family based on the model of a traditional conjugal
family. He has encouraged the formation of a close parent-child
relationship between his child and the nonparent partner and
has ignored completely the lack of a biological or legal link be-
tween the child and nonparent. Having done so, he has raised
the standing of the nonparent to the equivalent of a parent in
the eyes of his child." 6
The parent's action raises the nonparent's status in the eyes
of the law as well. The principles of the Michael H. case suggest
that, as in a "second family" reunification case, a best interests
test is constitutionally permissible in this situation. 7 Because
this custody dispute is not the result of an attack from the out-
side, the biological or legal parent does not deserve any defer-
ence greater than that provided by a best interests test.
Preferring the parent in this case would give exaggerated
significance to the existence of the biological connection between
the parent and the child by rewarding the fortuity of one party's
physiological capability or willingness to procreate. A more logi-
cal resolution would treat these types of cases as identical to the
custody cases between two biological parents that they so closely
resemble.
254. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 223, at 5.
255. See id. at 59-109 (discussing certain circumstances when the child's needs
would require state intervention).
256. In contrast, if the parent and child had gone to live with a grandparent or
another person, the standard for a classic removal case should apply. See supra
note 43.
257. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). The result would be strange
indeed if the custodial parent's formation of a new family was significant enough to
dilute the noncustodial parent's interests, but not those of the parent who formed
the second family in the first place.
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The biological parent must live with the consequences of his
action. Courts and legislatures should protect his child's expecta-
tions when the family has dissolved. The courts should not rec-
ognize the biological parent's claim of a superior right to custo-
dy. Instead, they should treat these cases as any other custody
dispute between two parents and apply the traditional best
interests test. 8
2. Reunification Cases
In the context of a reunification case, the court must decide
whether it is appropriate to disrupt the bond between the child
and the nonparent. The preference approach instructs the court
to start with the premise that the child should return to the
parent. 9 It translates into the affirmative policy that, under
certain circumstances, a court may reunite a capable parent
with his child, even if the nonparent has taken superb care of
the child.211 Therefore, as in a removal case, the preference in
favor of the parent requires the court to reject a comparison
approach. The court is not to view the case as a clean slate and
select the better caretaker or decide the case in favor of the
nonparent because the child is doing well under the current
custody arrangement.26'
258. This latter approach is consistent with Katharine Bartlett's theory that a court
should decide custody disputes by examining the parent-child relationship and mea-
suring the level of responsibility that the parent figure has demonstrated, rather
than on the basis of biology or other possessory concepts. Bartlett, supra note 8, at
297-306. Professor Woodhouse achieves a similar result by advocating that courts
define the family and decide custody disputes according to the child's view of her
family. Woodhouse, supra note 44, at 333-35.
Although some parties have alleged equitable estoppel, this argument has not
been very successful because courts have rigidly required the parties to prove fraud
or false dealings. See In re Halvorsen, 521 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Iowa 1994); see also
Polikoff, supra note 40, at 491-533 (discussing the estoppel argument in lesbian
parenting cases).
259. Richards, supra note 4, at 736.
260. Indeed, this factor can have an ironic effect. If the child's caretaker has taken
a higher level of care, the child more likely will have the emotional strength to ad-
just to yet another move. See Garrison, supra note 51, at 458-59 (discussing psycho-
logical research that suggests that the quality of pre- and post-separation care has a
significant impact on the ability of the child to adjust to the separation); Waters &
Noyes, supra note 252, at 512.
261. When two parents engage in postjudgment litigation over modifications in
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The preference approach is not the equivalent of a parental
rights stance. Under a preference standard, a fit parent may not
always regain custody of his child.262 The preference allows the
court to take into account the reality that, with each passing
day, the bond between the child and the nonparent grows more
firm.263 This standard does not cut off the court's inquiry after
the parent has established his fitness.2"
A parental rights rule is inappropriate in a reunification case.
In all reunification cases, the child may have an interest in
reuniting with her biological family and an interest in preserv-
ing the family unit of which she is now a part. Depending on
many variables, one or the other interest may be stronger. Psy-
chologists suggest that young children in particular define their
families in terms of emotional ties, not biology.265 As a conse-
quence, psychologists generally caution that courts must think
seriously before reuniting families when doing so would remove
a child from her long-term caretaker.266
a. "Parental Condition" Cases
The Constitution requires courts to give a preference to par-
ents whose incapability to care for their children has caused the
custody, the traditional approach disfavors moving the child, in order to maintain
continuity.
262. Richards, supra note 4, at 742-56.
263. See id. at 742-46.
264. Id. at 742-56.
265. Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of relationship
by blood-tie until quite late in their development .... What registers in
their minds are the day-to-day interchanges with the adults who take
care of them and who, on the strength of these, become the parent fig-
ures to whom they are attached.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 197, at 12-13.
266. Professors Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit argue that, once the child is removed
from her parent and forms a bond with her new caretaker, the child will suffer if
any disruption of that bond occurs. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 223, at 39-40.
They recommend that the court adopt a bright-line test for deciding whether to
return children to their parents, based primarily on the duration of the separation.
Id. at 39-57; see also infra note 383 (describing their recommendations). In contrast,
attachment theory supports a view that family ties are so enduring that children
can return to their parents without upset. See Waters & Noyes, supra note 252, at
512-14. Others also criticize Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit for overemphasizing the
continuity factor. Garrison, supra note 51, at 457-59.
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separation between the parent and child.267 Other policy con-
siderations also support a preference approach over a best inter-
ests comparison test.
A preference approach tells the parents that they get a second
chance. Hopefully, this standard will encourage parents with
problems to seek help and strive to rehabilitate themselves. The
preference should also reassure a parent that he need not fear
placing his child with a good and loving caretaker. If a parent
believes that he has no chance to compete with the caretaker
under the best interests approach, he may be less apt to agree
voluntarily to recognize his problems and settle his child with
someone capable and familiar to the child. Alternatively, if the
court removes the child, the parent who faces an unfavorable
comparison with the caretaker may be inclined to give up any
hope of reunification and lose the drive to keep up contact with
his child."
To the extent that the preference approach encourages par-
ents to act responsibly, society at large benefits."' It is also
good for the children. ° Not every child has a good alternative
home, even when the third party is a family member.
By adopting a preference test, policymakers would also ac-
knowledge that, to parents and children who love one another,
the loss of custody comes very close to a termination of parental
rights. This outcome is especially likely if hard feelings between
the adults involved trap the child in the middle of a bad situa-
tion that will cease only upon the reunification of the parent and
the child.' The preference approach is also consistent with
267. This conclusion is the logical extension of the Supreme Court's holding in
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), that courts must apply a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard when deciding whether to terminate parental rights, see
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
268. This development. would have a negative effect on children. Psychological stud-
ies indicate that most children do better if they remain in contact with their par-
ents, even if the children are never going to live with them again. Garrison, supra
note 51, at 455-69. The support for this notion is so strong that Garrison has chal-
lenged the traditional assumption that permanency planning for children removed
from their parents must necessarily take the form of termination of parental rights
and the cessation of all contact between the parent and the child. She proposes
permanent custody or guardianship with continued visitation. Id.
269. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 301.
270. Id. at 302-04.
271. If the nonparent loses custody, he probably would be entitled to visitation.
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the probability that, in this category of cases, the child may well
have every expectation that her separation from home is a tem-
porary condition.272
When a parent with a history of problems seeks custody, the
trial judge may well have questions and perhaps a healthy bit of
skepticism. Hopefully, the judge will also wonder about the
child's emotional well-being. These possibilities do not inevitably
suggest that a preference for the rehabilitated parent is a mis-
guided test. Rather, the court's inquiry into the conditions that
overcome the preference must focus on the factors that address
the judge's legitimate concerns.
b. "Second Family" Cases
The Constitution places few limits on the choice of a stan-
dard for those reunification cases in which the child is living
with a nonparent as a result of the formation of a second fami-
ly and the subsequent absence of the biological parent.Y This
type of case is one of the few third-party custody cases in
which a best interests approach is constitutionally permissible.
Under that test, the parent would prevail only if the parent
and child were very close, the child was not thriving with the
nonparent, or the parent offered far greater parenting skills
and material advantages.
In "second family" cases, the parent's condition did not con-
tribute at all to the parent-child separation. Applying a best
interests test for the "second family" group of cases may cause
the parent with problems in "parental condition" cases to prevail
more easily under a less stringent test. This effect runs counter
to the argument that the parent deserves a stronger preference
Hopefully, the bad feelings between the parties would decrease once the power
struggle was over.
272. Of course, this expectation will not necessarily exist in every case. If the child
was an infant when she went to live with the nonparent or if the parent originally
intended to allow the nonparent to adopt the child, the child may have no such
expectation.
273. This conclusion is the logical extension of the Supreme Court's decision in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), that legislative policy, rather than
constitutional law, should determine whether the State can presume a woman's hus-
band the father of her child, see supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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in the "second family" case. In "second family" cases, the parent
seeking reunification has not abandoned his child nor is he di-
rectly responsible for the formation of the second family.274 Yet
a "second family" case most likely involves a child who is com-
pletely settled into a life away from the noncustodial, visiting
parent. From the time she formed a second family with the now
absent parent, she may well have harbored no expectation that
she would one day live again with her noncustodial parent.27 5
The adoption of a preference approach best addresses the
tension between these positions. As in all other reunification
cases, the court would begin by assuming that the child will live
with her remaining parent. The judge will then have ample
opportunity to inquire into the circumstances and decide wheth-
er this particular child should stay with her nonparent.
B. Why Not a Presumption?
Most states express the preference for the parent as a pre-
sumption in favor of the parent."6 Although common, the pre-
sumption is not a wise choice as the mechanism for implement-
ing the standard in third-party custody cases. It fails to provide
the shorthand guidance to the trial courts for which the
policymakers were undoubtedly hoping. Unless painstakingly
defined, presumptions leave more procedural and substantive
questions than they answer.
1. What Is a Presumption?
The term "presumption" has several varied meanings. 77
Indeed, legal scholars have called the term one of the "slipperi-
est member[s] of the family of legal terms."2"8 Discerning the
274. The case of Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986), vividly illustrated the
problems that may arise when one parent consents to the other parent's having
custody and later faces the hurdle of challenging a stepparent for custody when the
custodial parent dies.
275. In Bailes, for example, the child appeared to have made such an assumption,
even though he visited with his natural mother on a regular basis. Id. at 825-26.
276. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995).
277. One author has identified eight meanings that courts have given the term
"presumption." Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presump-
tions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195, 196-209 (1953).
278. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 578 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed.
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effect of a presumption is often a confusing endeavor because of
the imprecise and different ways that both courts and legisla-
tures use the term."9
At the most basic level, the presumption is "a standardized
practice, under which certain facts are held to call for uniform
treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts."28
Presumptions are based on the logical probability that the exis-
tence of one fact renders another fact to be true.28' Courts and
legislatures create presumptions when one fact is particularly
difficult to prove" or when social or economic policies dictate
that one side should receive the favor of a presumption.2 " At
the root of the presumption, however, is the nexus of probability:
when one fact is true, the other usually follows.'
In some contexts, a presumption is used to prove a fact in a
manner that makes it no more powerful than a permissive infer-
ence.2"' The presumption allows the fact finder to infer one fact
from the existence of another.28 Commentators have soundly
criticized this definition as too narrow an approach, for it merely
permits the fact finder to make the connection and does not
compel the inference of the presumed fact.287
The most widely used definition of a presumption is one that
compels the fact finder to find a particular fact unless the other
side produces evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.2 "
1992).
279. Id. § 344, at 586. The editors of McCormick on Evidence consider the results
of courts' attempts to define the term a "judicial nightmare of confusion and incon-
sistency." Id.
280. Id. § 342, at 578.
281. Id. § 343, at 580. For example, if a piece of mail is properly addressed,
stamped, and mailed, the law presumes that the recipient actually received it. Id §
343, at 581.
282. Id. § 343, at 580. Because of proof difficulties, the law presumes that a
bailee's negligence caused damage to goods originally delivered in good condition. Id.
§ 343, at 581.
283. Id. § 343, at 580.
284. Id.
285. Id. § 342, at 578-79.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. § 344, at 582-83. This theory derived from Thayer's work, JAMES B.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898), and gained acceptance from
Wigmore, 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491, at 305 (James H. Chadbourn rev.
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Known as the "bursting bubble" theory, this approach shifts the
burden of producing evidence to the party against whom the
presumption operates."9 The effect of the presumption is
gone-the bubble bursts-once that party produces contrary evi-
dence.2" Under this approach, the presumption would have no
effect on the final decision, except in the unlikely event that the
party against whom it runs introduces no evidence at all tending
to rebut it. 291
The bursting bubble theory has been subject to extensive
criticism as giving presumptions "an effect that is too 'slight and
evanescent."'292 To correct this weakness, many scholars advo-
cate giving presumptions the effect of assigning the burden of
persuasion to the party against whom the presumption oper-
ates.29' They argue that public policy often provides the basis
for establishing presumptions.2 4 Thus, if a presumed fact is
"worthy of the name 'presumption,"' 2 9 it "ought to be good
enough to control a finding when the mind of the trier is in
equilibrium."296 Under this definition, the presumption may
well affect the ultimate outcome of the case because it requires
that the party contesting the existence of the presumed fact as-
1981). The Federal Rules of Evidence have also adopted this view:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EVID. 301.
289. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 344, at 582-83.
290. Id.
291. Id. In effect, the presumption allows the favored party to survive a motion for
directed verdict, but does no more. Id. Under this theory, presumptions are "like
bats of the law flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual
facts." Id. § 344, at 582 (quQting Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R. Co., 94
S.W. 256, 262 (Mo. 1906) (Lamm, J.)).
292. Id. § 344, at 583 (quoting Edward M. Morgan & John M. Maguire, Looking
Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 913 (1937)).
293. UNIF. R. EVID. 301(a), 13A U.LA. 130 (1986); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 278, § 344, at 586.
294. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 344, at 586-87.
295. Id. § 344, at 586.
296. EDWARD M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 81 (1956).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1045
sume the burden of persuasion.297
These approaches vary decidedly with respect to the strength
and duration of the presumption's effect.29 What they all
share, however, is a probative link between two facts.299 The
confusion over the operation of a presumption peaks when there
is no logical connection between the fact presumed and the fact
from which it purports to follow, as when the presumption arises
solely from social policy reasons. 00 In that situation, the pre-
sumption can amount to a substantive rule of law rather than a
procedural mechanism for proving certain evidentiary facts.3 '
Commentators suggest eliminating the use of the term "pre-
sumption" in this context and point to the "presumption of inno-
cence" as an example.0 2 The law "presumes" a criminal defen-
dant innocent not because courts always believe that the individ-
ual is, factually speaking, most probably innocent. Rather, for
social policy reasons, the law strives to protect those persons
who are truly innocent by placing the burden'of persuasion on
the State and by requiring a high level of proof.03 Because the
"presumption" really has nothing to do with presuming one fact
from another, commentators suggest calling it instead the "as-
sumption of innocence" and thus avoiding confusion between its
meaning and the meaning of true evidentiary presumptions."'
2. Presumptions in Third-Party Custody Cases
The problems that plague presumptions in general also con-
fuse the effect of presumptions in favor of parents in third-party
custody cases. The presumptions vary widely with respect to the
facts presumed, the evidentiary effect of the presumption, and
297. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 344, at 586. The editors of
McCormick on Evidence have called this latter approach the better use of the term
"presumption." Id. Several states and the Uniform Rules of Evidence have adopted
this approach. Id. § 344, at 587-88.
298. See id. § 344 (describing the Thayer and Morgan approaches to presumptions).
299. See id. § 343, at 580.
300. See id. § 344, at 588-89 (describing the effects of social policy on the operation
of presumptions).
301. Id.





the evidence relevant to rebut the presumption. The presump-
tion thus becomes a poor and unreliable guide for trial courts
faced with custody battles between parents and nonparents.
Some states presume that the parent is fit. 5 but allow re-
buttal through a showing that the parent is unfit or otherwise
lacks the characteristics of a parent."'6 Other jurisdictions
couch the presumption in different terms, asserting that the best
interests of the child require her to be with the parent.0 7 Some
states mandate that, in order to rebut the "best interests" pre-
sumption, the nonparent must show that the child's best inter-
ests dictate that custody be awarded to the nonparent. °8 Other
states express the rebuttal standard in terms of a showing of
harm or detriment to the child."0 9 Yet another approach cre-
ates a presumption that is met and disappears when the
nonparent produces any evidence in his favor.10 The burden is
then on the nonparent to prove which custodial arrangement
would serve the child's best interests.3 ' The net effect of this
test is that the parent prevails only if all other considerations
are equal."2 These substantive and evidentiary variations
push the presumption standard toward one or the other type of
305. See Schuh v. Roberson, 788 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Ark. 1990); Durkin v. Hinich,
442 N.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Minn. 1989); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40
(Utah 1982).
306. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the nonparent rebuts
the presumption only by showing that the parent generally lacks: (1) a strong mutu-
al bond with the child, (2) a demonstrated willingness to sacrifice his welfare for the
child, and (3) the sympathy for and understanding of the child generally characteris-
tic of parents. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41.
307. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995).
308. Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Patrick v. Byerly,
325 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Va. 1985). The nonparent bears both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion. Haynie, supra note 19, at 716.
309. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995); Richards, su-
pra note 4, at 742-43.
310. See Comer v. Comer, 300 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (awarding
custody to a child's paternal aunt and uncle because an award of custody to the
natural mother would not serve the child's ,best interests).
311. See id.
312. Salthe, supra note 19, at 539-40. Commentators have described this approach
as the "tie-breaker" rule. Id. Parenthood only enters the best interests equation
when the court determines that both parties are equally competent to care for the
child. Id. at 540.
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standard-the best interests test or the parental rights test.13
The presumption that the parent is fit may be proper from the
standpoint of probability and statistics: most parents are fit. To
rebut the presumption of fitness, the nonparent must produce
evidence of parental unfitness. " This particular presumption
does little, however, to state a comprehensive standard for decid-
ing all types of third-party custody cases. It provides the court
with no guidance for weighing the other factors, once the court
finds the parent is fit. Does the presumption mean that, if the
parent is fit, he should get custody of the child, regardless of all
other considerations, or is the presumption merely an eviden-
tiary mechanism for finding just one of several necessary ele-
ments in the case? If the former view prevails, then the fitness
presumption is no different than the parental rights standard.
For reunification cases in particular, it is a woefully incomplete
decisional standard.
The other common presumption provides that the court must
begin by presuming that the best interests of the child require
her parent to have custody.315 This presumption is an attempt
to address more completely the ultimate issue before the
court-the child's welfare." 6 For this reason, it is probably a
better and more useful guide for the trial courts than is the pre-
sumption of fitness. It has its own problems, however.
First, the probative strength of the "best interests" pre-
sumption favoring parents is not evident in all types of third-
313. Id. All of these rules have a significant impact on the formation of strategies
by counsel. The attorney must consider whether her client takes on the burden of
persuasion by filing suit, whether her client benefits by bringing suit in one jurisdic-
tion rather than another, the effect of inevitable litigation delays, with whom the
child lives and continues to bond during those delays, and whether any or all of
these considerations tend to push people to self-help. See Dickson v. Lascaris, 423
N.E.2d 361, 364 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that delays caused by legal proceedings should
not affect custody rights); Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 168 n.9 (Tex.
1990) (same).
314. Whether the nonparent also bears the risk of nonpersuasion depends on
whether the jurisdiction has a Thayerian "bursting bubble" view of presumptions or
takes the approach recommended in McCormick on Evidence. See MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 344 (analyzing the effect of the two views of presump-
tions in civil litigation).




party cases. The psychological evidence suggests that maintain-
ing continuity with the current caretaker usually serves the
child's best interests. 17 Under this definition of "best inter-
ests," only the use of the presumption in removal cases rests on
probability. In a reunification case, it may run counter to certain
psychological principles. 18
Second, the best interests presumption raises the serious
question of what evidence is necessary to rebut it. Although the
presumption places the burden of rebuttal on the nonparent, the
type of evidence required for rebuttal remains unclear. If the
nonparent may rebut the presumption with any sort of evidence
that parental custody would not serve the child's best interests,
then this test is nothing more than a procedurally contrived best
interests test. Any minor factor in the n6nparent's favor will
rebut the presumption. Its effect of preferring the parent is
illusory, especially if the presumption "bubble" bursts as soon as
the nonparent produces any evidence."'
Problems remain, however, if the nonparent must rebut the
presumption with something other than evidence regarding the
child's best interest, such as proof of substantial harm or detri-
ment to the child.' This approach serves the purpose of creat-
ing a test that actually prefers the parent, but it strains the
basic construction of a presumption. If the law presumes a par-
ticular fact, then, logically, the other party should be able to
counter it with evidence showing that the presumed fact is not
317. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 197, at 6-7.
318. Id. at 6.
319. See MCCORIIICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 344, at 582-83.
320. Rebutting a presumption becomes even more complicated when the legislature
defines the standard for rebuttal in ambiguous terms. For example, Black's Law
Dictionary defines "detriment" as "[any loss or harm suffered in person or property."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 64, at 451 (emphasis added). A "plain lan-
guage" or dictionary definition construction of the statutory provision suggests that a
showing of any harm to the child occasioned by awarding custody to the parent
would establish "detriment" sufficient to rebut a parental presumption. Can rebuttal
really be that easy? If detriment to the child means any harm, no matter how mini-
mal or short-term, then the rebuttable presumption, once again, dissolves into a best
interests test. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (West Supp. 1995) (providing
for an example of a statutory presumption with "detriment" as the standard for
rebuttal); see also Kaas, supra note 91, at 237-41 (discussing the meaning of detri-
ment under Connecticut law).
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actually true. 2 1 Requiring the party against whom the pre-
sumption operates to rebut the presumed fact with proof of a
wholly different fact undermines the probability nexus upon
which the presumption mechanism rests. 22
The preference in favor of a natural parent does not serve as a
mere procedural device for relieving the parent of the need to
prove certain facts. Rather, it is a substantive rule of law, favor-
ing family integrity and encouraging responsible behavior on the
part of parents. The preference may or may not accord with
traditional notions of the child's "best interests." It may only
rarely rest on the need to find one fact from the existence of
another. It is more like an "assumption,""= with the law choos-
ing, for purely policy reasons, to start with the notion that a
child belongs with her parent.
For these reasons, the presumption is an awkward and ill-
designed device for expressing the parental preference. Pre-
sumptions carry with them a century of disagreement over their
proper evidentiary effect 24 and require courts to squeeze a pol-
icy statement into the language of an evidentiary fact-finding
tool. Even considering the presumption in its strongest sense, as
a device that shifts the burden of persuasion, fails to resolve the
dilemma in a third-party custody case. Knowing which party
bears the burden of persuasion is, indeed, an important consid-
eration, but policymakers could more easily meet such a narrow
objective by explicitly assigning the burden of proof.
In the hardest cases, there are no questions of fact as to which
person could better raise the child. Nor are they cases in which
the burden of persuasion is the decisive factor because the trier's
mind is "in equilibrium."32 The tough removal cases present
fact patterns in which the parent hovers on the line of minimal
321. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 343, at 580.
322. See id. (discussing the role of probability in the formulation of presumptions).
323. In this context, the preference operates quite like the "presumption" of inno-
cence. See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
324. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 344 (discussing various ap-
plications of presumptions in civil cases).
325. Still, the issue of which party bears the risk of nonpersuasion is not unimpor-
tant. For example, if a case involves contested and controversial allegations of fact,
such as parental drug use, the custody outcome may well depend on whether the
party with the burden of persuasion proved or disproved the allegation.
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adequacy, while the nonparent is financially and emotionally
stable. The difficult reunification cases involve children who are,
without any doubt, happy and well-adjusted in the nonparent's
home and for whom a move will not be easy.
What the court and the parties need in both of these cases is
a clear statement of the effect of the preference and the condi-
tions under which the preference is overcome. 26 Under any of
its various definitions, a presumption does not provide these
definitive and substantive standards. The policymakers have not
done their job when they create an elusive and murky presump-
tion, straining its limited function with a task for which pre-
sumptions were never designed and then leave the courts to
decide its effect. A far better approach is to avoid altogether the
mechanism of the presumption.327 Policymakers should ac-
knowledge their preference in terms of an assumption that chil-
dren should be in the custody of their parents. They then should
define the strength of their preference by expressing directly
which factors will overcome it. Courts need explicit standards
that define the limited circumstances under which they may
acceptably remove a child from her parent, and in which they
may appropriately decline to return the child to the parent.
C. Overcoming the Preference
Policymakers cannot tell trial judges only that they must
prefer a parent when deciding a third-party custody matter.
With nothing more, this statement gives no indication of the
strength of the preference or of the type of evidence that is per-
missible and relevant. An examination of the type of evidence
and how much of it overcomes the preference reveals the true
impact of the preference in favor of parents. If the preference is
overcome by a wide spectrum of factors, then it functions as
326. Many guardianship statutes use this approach. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45a-610 (West 1993).
327. A presumption is an attempt to do through a "legal fiction" what courts
should do directly. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 278, § 344, at 588 (citing
Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Ac-
tions-An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 NW. U.
L. REV. 892 (1982); Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66
IOWA L. REv. 843 (1981)).
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little more than a best interests test. If only the most extreme
set of facts suffices, then the test becomes the equivalent of a
parental rights standard."' Creating a test that lies in the
middle of these two extremes requires carefully defined stan-
dards that limit the trial court's focus, but that also leave the
court enough discretion to respond to the individual variations of
each case. The guidelines for setting these standards come from
the constitutionally prescribed rights of the parties, psychologi-
cally sound principles of a child's physical and emotional needs,
the need to encourage responsible behavior by parents, and the
goal of creating standards consistent with other child removal
provisions.
1. Removal Cases
a. An Examination of Parental Fitness
In a case in which a nonparent seeks to remove a child from
the custody of a parent, the challenge is to decide under which
conditions the court should interfere with and disrupt the daily
parent-child relationship. The court's task is not to select the
best caretaker."9 Rather, judges must identify those parents
who are simply incapable of taking adequate care of their chil-
dren 3" Only in those cases do the child's care needs outweigh
the confusion, upheaval, and hurt that she will undoubtedly
suffer from being removed from her parent.
Deciding when a situation requires removal is not new or
unique to third-party custody cases. Courts in every state face
this issue when acting on abuse and neglect petitions brought by
child protection agencies."' In all states, the standards for re-
328. See Salthe, supra note 19, at 539-41 (discussing the best interests and paren-
tal rights tests).
329. Once again, cases in which the parent and nonparent cared for the child to-
gether represent the only exception to this test in removal situations.
330. The court in a removal case should consider strongly "whether the child can
be protected from the specific harm(s) justifying intervention if left in the home."
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 650-51 (1976). The
court should first vigorously examine whether services short of removal are "ade-
quate to ensure that the child will not be injured again." Id. at 651.
331. Recognizing that other judges often have to make such decisions does not
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moval focus on the parent's ability to provide the child with a
minimum level of care and safety.
3 1 2
First and foremost, this minimum needs test defers to the
interests of family integrity, while providing a mechanism for
ensuring that children receive safe and adequate care. It also
achieves harmony and uniformity with other child removal stat-
utes that already exist. In abuse and neglect cases, the family's
problems do not give the court license to go searching for the
best possible person to raise the child.333 Likewise, they should
not do so in third-party removal cases.
In a removal case, the court's inquiry must focus solely on the
parent's fitness as a parent. The court should examine the
parent's presente3 characteristics, but only to the extent that
those characteristics have an impact on the child's well-be-
ing."5 The court should consider whether the parent presently
has the necessary emotional commitment and capability to fulfill
his child's3 6 basic needs for: (1) love and affection, (2) food,
clothing, and medical care, (3) adequate residential arrange-
ments, (4) social and educational guidance, and (5) freedom from
physical harm.
37
mean that the choices are routine or easy. Custody decisions are traumatic for judg-
es because they are so important and are seldom clear-cut. Jon Elster, Solomonic
Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
332. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-717() (West 1993).
333. Rather, before considering any separation of the parent and the child, the
courts task is to inquire into the parent's minimum fitness.
334. The focus is on the parent's present capability. Past behavior, including past
abuse, may be relevant, but only to the extent that it illuminates a parent's present
characteristics. Past conduct is not an automatic indicator of current conduct.
335. This caveat is also found in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's best
interests statute. See supra note 78. The court should only consider parental conduct
that affects his relationship with his child. See supra note 78.
336. The result may vary slightly depending on the individual needs of each child.
For example, a child with particularly challenging problems may need a parent with
more sophisticated knowledge of the care that she needs.
337. See Wald, supra note 330, at 649-50. Trying to define a standard for removal
that goes beyond one of preventing only physical abuse always presents a danger.
Once the standard begins to address concepts such as neglect and a child's psycho-
logical needs, it invites subjective and arbitrary enforcement. Guggenheim, supra
note 51, at 554. The potential for class bias and cultural stereotyping is a real prob-
lem. Id- at 549-50. Yet courts cannot completely ignore the emotional needs of the
child. Judges must be aware of the power that they possess and attempt to wield it
fairly, without punishing poor families for their poverty.
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In deciding whether to remove the child, the court should not
consider the potential third-party custodian in any way. The
attributes and parenting capabilities of the nonparent are com-
pletely irrelevant to the determination of whether the parent
can care for his child. The court also cannot appropriately con-
sider the type and nature of the relationship between the child
and the nonparent.
Removal cases often involve claims by nonparents who are
members of the child's extended family and whom the child
knows and loves.33 Often, the nonparent seeking custody is a
grandparent. 39 The temptation therefore arises to create a
"sliding scale" test for removal cases: the closer the emotional
ties between the child and the nonparent, the less cause the
court must find before it can remove the child. After all, when a
grandparent seeks custody, the consequences of removal seem
less dire. The court does not send the child to live with a strang-
er, as may happen in a foster care placement.
This approach, however, would be a serious and dangerous
encroachment on the family's need for autonomy. The removal
decision must remain a rigidly separate consideration from the
question of where the child would live if removed. 4 The avail-
ability of extended family members as alternative caretakers
does not make removal a trouble-free solution to a nuclear
family's problems. Placing the child with family members or
The third-party custody standard may not be any better at solving these
problems than are other approaches, but judges can apply it in an equally effective
manner. For example, a judge should not require parents to provide their children
with a predetermined level of financial comfort. Further, courts should not automati-
cally remove the children of homeless parents simply on the basis of their
homelessness; adequate, albeit minimal, residential arrangements should include
temporary shelters and other dependence on public assistance. In some cases, judges
can appropriately examine the circumstances of a parent's homelessness. For exam-
ple, if a substance abuse problem is interfering with a parent's ability to procure
and maintain adequate shelter, the parent is not likely to meet many of the child's
other needs, and removal may be warranted. If, however, the parent's unemployment
has caused the family's homelessness, removal is cruel and unwarranted. In such a
case, the court should focus on keeping the family together and providing support.
338. See, e.g., Comer v. Comer, 300 S.E.2d 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
339. Richards, supra note 4, at 734-35.
340. These issues are separate in abuse and neglect proceedings resulting in foster




friends will not erase the pain of the child's separation from her
parent. This approach also invites family meddling and
intergenerational conflicts" and underestimates the emotional
investment of the nonparent in sabotaging the parent-child rela-
tionship. 2 Because of the difficulties inherent in later return-
ing clhildren to the parent's home, a court should not enter light-
ly into a removal case and thereby invite the more complex con-
flicts of a reunification case at some future point.
Grandparents and other family members or friends who are
willing and able to take on the responsibilities of raising a child
deserve commendation. When the court must remove a child
from her parent, the presence of a familiar caretaker will un-
doubtedly soften the shock to the child. However, the court must
guard against confusing the availability of a good, alternative
home for the child with the very grounds for removal. Improper
comparisons between the parent and the nonparent become too
easy and may slip into a best interests inquiry. A parent may
decide for himself to ask a grandparent or other person to care
for his child, perhaps before his problems reach crisis level. That
decision is his choice. When the proceeding is contested, how-
ever, the court must decline to dilute the minimum fitness
standard.
In deciding whether to remove a child, the court need not
consider why the parent cannot fulfill the child's basic needs.
Whether a parent is "at fault" for his problems or incapable
because of mental illness, mental disability, or substance abuse
is irrelevant to the basic question of whether the parent can care
for the child. Sympathy for the parent cannot outweigh the
child's need to live in a safe environment. Once the court has
341. Richards, supra note 4, at 734-35.
342. Intrafamilial custody disputes often arise from battles over other family griev-
ances. Some of the ugliest stories involve parents engaged in custody battles with
their own parents. See Schult v. Schult, No. FA-91-03-50-59S, 1994 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 429 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 1994); In re Jacqueline D., Nos. N87-128 &
82341, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1037 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1992). The litera-
ture warns child placement workers about the difficult dynamics involved in such
placements. Joseph R. Carrieri, The Legal Handbook of Foster Care, Termination of
Parental Rights and Adoptions, in CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND THE FOSTER CARE
SYSTEM 1993, at 7 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. C-166,
1993).
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granted custody to the nonparent, however, the cause of the
parent's present unfitness often becomes important. It is ger-
mane to the question of what visitation orders are appropriate
and whether the parent can ever gain or regain the capacity to
care for the child. The origin of the parent's problems will shape
the court's ultimate ruling and will have an impact on the entry
of orders subsidiary to the custody decision. It should not, how-
ever, inform the central question of custody.
b. Support from Existing Case Law
Many states already have gravitated toward a fitness inquiry
in third-party custody removal cases.3" In most of these states,
the parental preference is expressed in terms of a presump-
tion.' However, in the course of discussing whether the
nonparent has rebutted the presumption, the courts tend to
identify the relevant factors, doing so in terms quite like those
identified above. 45
In Texas, the third-party custody statute provides that a third
party can rebut the natural parent presumption by showing that
granting custody to the parent "would significantly impair the
child's physical health or emotional development."4 ' In
Lewelling v. Lewelling,347 the Supreme Court of Texas gave
further definition to the standard, reversing a trial court's award
of custody to paternal grandparents.348 The child was residing
with the mother after his parents' separation when the paternal
343. See, e.g., Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1990). A look at
the various state court decisions can be misleading unless one is careful to note the
standard that the state has adopted. Another important consideration is that most
appellate courts view their role as determining whether the evidence supports the
trial court's decision, not whether the appellate judge would have assessed the evi-
dence in the same way. For that reason, the end result of any particular case is not
necessarily the best barometer of the strength of the parental preference in any
given state. Most appellate courts affirm trial court custody decisions.
344. See, e.g., id.
345. See, e.g., id. at 167-68.
346. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995). This subsection of the
Texas statute has not changed since the 1990 Lewelling decision. Id. § 14.01 Histori-
cal & Statutory Notes.
347. 796 S.W.2d 164.
348. Id. at 168-69.
1112
THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY
grandparents sought custody.349 The court construed the stat-
ute as requiring the court to decide the level of dysfunction that
would render the mother capable of causing significant harm to
her child.35" The court was quite emphatic when it defined the
task before the trial court as not simply a search for the better
custodian.35' In reversing the trial court's decision, the court
concluded that living with a mother who was unemployed, who
had undergone periods of psychiatric treatment, and who was
the victim of spousal abuse would not impair the child. 52
Virginia also has a preference, defined by case law, favoring
parents in third-party custody cases. In Bottoms v. Bottoms,
3 13
the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that a parent's rights
should be respected if at all consonant with the child's best in-
terests. Like the Texas Supreme Court in Lewelling, the Virginia
appellate court had rejected the notion that the trial court's job
was "to consider whether a third party might be better able to
care for a child ,"8' " even when the parental level of care is only
"marginally satisfactory.",5  Rather, the test is whether the
parent's behavior "poses a substantial threat of harm to a child's
emotional, psychological, or physical well-being."
356
In Bottoms, the Virginia appellate court had found no evi-
dence that the mother's living arrangement and lesbian rela-
tionship would harm her son emotionally or psychologically.357
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial
349. Id. at 165.
350. Id. at 166.
351. Id. at 167.
352. Id.
353. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
354. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 280 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 457
S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 282.
357. Id. at 283-84. The court first reversed the trial court's decision that the
mother's homosexuality rendered her an unfit parent per se. Id. at 282-83. The court
then cited with approval the state supreme court's conclusion in Doe v. Doe, 284
S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981), that "children who are raised with a loving couple of the
same sex are [no] more disturbed, unhealthy, or maladjusted than children raised
with a loving couple of mixed sex." Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Doe, 284
S.E.2d at 806). The dissenting opinion in the supreme court decision also stressed
the absence of any evidence that the mother's homosexual conduct had an adverse
effect on the child. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
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court had sufficient evidence of parental neglect to rule for the
grandmother.35 The court also concluded that, in some cases, a
parent's homosexual conduct can impose the unacceptably heavy
burden of "social condemnation,"59 making it a factor to consider.
Other nonparents have prevailed under this type of fitness
test. 60 In Hunt v. Whalen, 6' an Indiana court affirmed a
grant of custody to grandparents. 62 The court held that the
grandparents had rebutted the parental presumption with clear
and convincing evidence" that the mother was unable to pro-
vide adequate nutrition for the child, had failed to follow specific
358. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
359. Id. The majority criticized the appellate court for not confining its inquiry to the
appropriate appellate scope. Id. at 107. The court found and recited numerous exam-
ples of parental incapacity, quite apart from the mother's lesbianism, in the trial re-
cord. Id. at 108. These facts arguably called into question the mother's ability to pro-
vide an adequate home for her son. The majority overlooked, however, that the trial
court relied principally on the homosexual conduct of the mother, not these other
factors. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 282. To the extent that this case suggests that, with
no proof of harm to the child, parental sexual conduct is relevant to the question of
removal, it is not an example of a parental fitness inquiry as defined in this Article.
360. The parental preference requires a judge to consider more than just the choice
of a custodian. The policy favoring family preservation also places a responsibility on
the trial judge to protect actively the bond between the parent and the child. Active
protection includes expediting cases in the court system. Horror stories about judicial
delays abound, but few are as incredible as the Baby Jessica case. In re Baby Girl
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1, and 114 S. Ct. 11
(1993). The natural father first filed to nullify the adoption when the baby was only
six weeks old. See id. at 652. The court cases dragged on for more than two years,
thus increasing the risk that the natural parent would lose simply because of the
passage of time and assuring extreme trauma to the child when the natural parent
eventually prevailed. Id. at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting) ("[Elvery expert testified that
there would be serious traumatic injury to the child.").
If removal is necessary, the court should articulate clearly its basis for finding
that the parent lacked the capability to care for his child. The decision should state
exactly what the parent must do to regain custody. The court also should order the
parties, including the child, to participate in counseling whenever even arguably ap-
propriate. Finally, the court should order the maximum amount of visitation between
the parent and the child that is appropriate, including overnight visits, so that the
child maintains a sense of her parent's house as her "home." Judge West took this
approach in Foster v. Devino, No. 0110479, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1161 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 5, 1994). Because he believed that the grandparents' custody should
continue only as long as absolutely necessary, his opinion laid out a blueprint for
the mother's reunification with her children. Id. at *20-21.
361. 565 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
362. Id. at 1110.
363. Id. at 1111.
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medical advice for treating the child, and had no source of in-
come,3  all of which are, arguably, indicators of the parent's
inability to meet the child's basic needs.365
In Foster v. Devino,366 a Connecticut trial court granted custo-
dy of two children to their paternal grandparents, who had inter-
vened in a custody dispute between the parents. 67 The judge
found that the grandparents had rebutted the presumption in
favor of the parents by proving that remaining in the custody of
their mother would prove detrimental.368 The children had sev-
eral unexplained injuries, and the mother had an unstable living
arrangement, had refused to cooperate with a parenting assistance
program, and had continuously interfered with the children's visi-
tation with their father and paternal grandparents. 69 Finally,
the judge found that the mother had no insight into the negative
effect that her behavior had on the children. 7 °
c. Burden and Quantum of Proof
Final considerations that give the preference its strength are
the assignment of the burden of persuasion and the setting of
the level of proof. In removal cases, the nonparent must have
the burden of proving the parent's incapability by clear and con-
vincing evidence. This is consistent with the policy concerns that
called for the preference in the first place. It is also uniform
364. Id. at 1112.
365. In most jurisdictions, facts such as these would most likely also support a find-
ing of parental unfitness. See, e.g., In re J.L.B., 594 P.2d 1127, 1129-31 (Mont. 1979).
However, in an older case, a court purported to apply a presumption test but found it
rebutted by essentially lifestyle choices, not parental incapacity. Painter v. Bannister,
140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). In Painter, the Supreme
Court of Iowa reversed the trial court's award of custody to the parent. Id. at 158. Al-
though conceding that the father was not "morally unfit," the court described him as
"Bohemian'"-able to offer his son a "romantic" and "intellectually stimulating" life, but
one that was "impractical" and "unstable." Id. at 154-56. The ruling was a value-laden
choice in favor of the grandparents' "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class,
middlewest" lifestyle, id., and unrelated to the father's ability to care adequately for
his child. The court compared the two home environments to determine which was
"better," id. at 153, yet it defined "better" in extraordinarily judgmental terms.
366. No. 0110479, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1161 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 1994).
367. Id. at *20.
368. Id. at *11.
369. Id. at *14-18.
370. Id. at *13.
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with most abuse and neglect statutes.
The clear and convincing standard requires a court to exercise
caution when contemplating removal of a child. The risk of error
is serious, for the child will suffer emotional trauma upon sepa-
ration. Even if the child is one day reunited with her parent, the
removal forever alters their relationship. Further, the possibility
always looms that, once a child goes to live with a nonparent,
she may never be able to go home again.
2. Reunification Cases
a. An Evaluation of the Psychological Impact on the Child
i. Selecting the Test
The preference in favor of a parent establishes that, in all types
of reunification cases, the court must start with the assumption
that the child should return to live with her parent. The question
then becomes one of deciding which factors the court should look
at to decide whether a change in custody is appropriate.
Resolving a reunification case often will require the court to
engage in a two-step process. 172 The threshold consideration
concerns whether the parent is capable of having custody. The
parent who lost custody by court order in a prior third-party
custody removal case first must demonstrate his new parental
capability 73 by a preponderance of the evidence.
For the initial determination of custody between the parent and
the nonparent,74 a threshold determination of capability is not
automatically necessary. If, however, the nonparent challenges the
parent's fitness, he or she should have to prove the parent's inca-
371. For example, the Uniform Juvenile Court Act requires clear and convincing evi-
dence before finding a child "deprived." UNIF. Juv. CT. ACT § 29(c), 9A U.L.A. 39 (1968).
372. In many cases, the court first must determine whether the parent is capable
of meeting the child's minimum needs. When the court previously has removed the
child from the parent's custody, it will have to find that the cause for the removal
no longer exists. However, even in cases in which the court never found the parent
incapable of caring for his child, the nonparent may raise the issue, as either a
matter of good faith or as a tactical maneuver.
373. Removal cases follow this analysis. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
374. A reunification scenario without a prior court-ordered removal cannot arise in
an abuse and neglect case. A reunification situation occurs only if a parent volun-
tarily leaves his child with a family member or friend or a parent seeks custody
from a third-party with whom the other parent has left the child.
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pability by clear and convincing evidence, as in a removal
case.
375
Assuming that the court finds that the parent meets the mini-
mum standard of parental capability, the court must then face
the second essential question in a reunification case-whether
the child should stay with the nonparent, even though the par-
ent is fully capable of caring for his child. To answer this ques-
tion, the court's inquiry should turn exclusively to the child.3 7
6
The only ground sufficient to overcome the preference in favor of
a capable parent is proof that the change in custody will cause
the child significant and long-term psychological harm.
This decision to focus on the impact on the child is not an
adoption of the traditional best interests test. The degree of
emotional harm to the child is certainly one element of a best
interests test and may very well be the most crucial. Nonethe-
less, the impact test restricts the court's inquiry to this single
issue. Because the impact test is the only basis for declining to
grant the parent custody, the nonparent cannot prevail simply
because he or she has taken good care of the child.
The impact approach accomplishes the goal of bringing fami-
lies back together and permits courts to identify those cases in
which reunification of the family exacts too high an emotional
cost on the child. In every case, a move would cause disruption
in the child's life; in some, it would cause her permanent emo-
375. See supra part IV.C.I.c. The nonparent should bear this burden even in cases
in which the parent voluntarily placed his child with the nonparent. "Preferring" this
parent by not requiring him to prove his capability rewards him for recognizing his
own limitations and choosing to safeguard his child's needs. The first prong of a
reunification case appropriately requires the nonparent to prove the parent's incapac-
ity by the same quantum of evidence demanded in a removal case. Requiring the
nonparent to prove the parent's incapacity guarantees consistent standards for all
initial judicial decisions that relate to a parent's fitness to care for his child. When
a parent voluntarily places his child with a nonparent, he may draw his own line
for acceptable parenting at a higher level than a court would have set in a contest-
ed proceeding. The court should not penalize the parent for wanting to make sure
his child would receive more than he was able to provide.
376. This emphasis on the impact on the child is not a novel concept. Justice Jo-
seph Story recognized that the question in a reunification custody case is "whether
[returning the child to the parent] will be for the real, permanent interests of the
infant." United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.D. R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256).
This focus on the child's needs has enjoyed a recent resurgence. See, e.g.,
Woodhouse, supra note 165; Woodhouse, supra note 44.
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tional harm. Exposing a child to some discomfort is acceptable,
so long as the court has a reasonable basis for believing that the
child will readjust with no permanent emotional scars. Causing
permanent psychological damage to a child in order to reunite a
family is not acceptable, however, no matter how the parent and
child became separated.377 The impact test thus is appropriate
for both "parental condition" and "second family" reunification
cases.
Choosing the impact test as the sole criterion for overcoming a
preference is an explicit rejection of a test that differentiates
among cases on the basis of parental conduct. The impact ap-
proach does not assess or judge the parent's condition for several
reasons. First and foremost, decisions based on the degree of
"blame" that the parent carries would often result in more seri-
ous harm to the child.378 The "second family" cases may involve
a parent who bears no "fault" for the separation, and yet his
child may be completely integrated into a nonparent's home.
Having just suffered the loss of the custodial parent, can the
child now endure losing everything and everyone else familiar?
In contrast, the child who is in the care of the nonparent while
her parent goes through drug rehabilitation may be expecting to
go home "as soon as Daddy is well again." The parent's behavior
is hardly exemplary, but should a court frustrate the child's
fondest desires in order to punish the parent for his poor past
conduct? Courts should not decide the custody of the child with
the purpose of rewarding blameless conduct or punishing blame-
worthy behavior.
A second good reason justifies rejecting a test that focuses on
the nature of the parent's incapability. Ranking all of the per-
mutations and achieving consensus on the levels of culpability
would be very difficult. Reasonable people disagree, for example,
377. One of the most sympathetic figures imaginable is a single parent involved in
a car accident. The parent bears no blame for the accident, but he is in a coma for
ten years. During that time, a family member raises his child, who was an infant at
the time of the accident. When the parent awakens, the question becomes whether
he should get the child back automatically.
378. The results of a "blame" test also may be opposite to the outcome required by
the Constitution. See generally Hill, supra note 6, at 365 (explaining that the
Constitution's Due Process Clause protects parental authority).
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whether an alcoholic can control his drinking or whether he has
a disease. Is substance abuse "worse" than teenage pregnancy?
Perhaps a parent has a psychiatric disorder and fails to take his
medication for years because of his delusions. Later, when he is
once again fit to resume custody, is he really to blame for the
long separation? Should the law fault the father whose child was
born and placed for adoption without his knowledge, but who ex-
hausts every avenue when he learns of the child's existence?
These questions are hard to answer, would spark heated debate,
and yet serve no purpose in the search for a standard that will
overcome the preference without destroying the child.
ii. Identifying the Relevant Considerations
A further question concerns the type of evidence the court
should consider to decide the ultimate issue of whether a change
in custody will cause serious psychological harm to the child.
The court faces the admittedly challenging task of looking into
the future and drawing the line between an ordinary readjust-
ment process and psychological harm of a long-term nature.
Several factors bear on the difficulty of the move for the child.
These variables may be present in either type of reunification
case.
Perhaps the most important consideration is the closeness of
the bond between the parent and the child. If the parent and the
child enjoy frequent and lengthy visits, share their feelings and
affection freely, and participate in the important events of each
others' lives, the court is less likely to find that a move will
cause the child substantial harm. The corollary is also true. The
closer the bond between the nonparent and the child, the more
likely the court will be to find that a move will cause emotional
trauma to the child.379
Several other variables may be present in either type of reuni-
379. This test is similar to a suggestion that courts should decide these cases on
the basis of "affection-relationships." Based on the psychological theories of Anna
Freud and Erik Erikson and the case of Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en
banc), the relevant consideration under this theory is the degree of the child's depen-
dence on her affection-relationship. See Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
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fication case to assist the court in assessing the degree of psy-
chological impact a change in custody would have on the
child. s° A court should examine the following factors: 8 '
(1) the level of integration of the child into the nonparent's
family, including the length of time the child has been
there, 8 2 her age at arrival, and her attachment to any half-
or step-siblings;'8
(2) the strength of the existing bond between the child and
the parent, including whether she ever lived with the parent
and the nature and frequency of visitation;
(3) the likelihood that the bond with the parent could become
stronger within a reasonable length of time;
(4) the parent's awareness of the child's potential readjustment
problems and his willingness to address them appropriately;
(5) the child's preference;
380. Of course, a court may admit the testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist
as an expert on the issue.
381. Setting forth guidelines presents the risk that courts will apply them in an
overly mechanical fashion. "[Gluidelines may become prescriptions if decision-makers
fail to understand the logic and goals behind them." Waters & Noyes, supra note
252, at 512.
382. Normally, the court should not consider the length of time due solely to the
litigation process. However, if the child was very young when she began living with
the nonparent, the court should take that delay into account. Otherwise, the impact
test would become an illusory safeguard for the youngest, and thus the most vulner-
able, children.
383. Professors Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit advocate measuring time in a manner
relevant to the child's perception of time, which changes depending on the child's
developmental stage. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 197, at 40-45. The younger the
child, the shorter the time period that she can tolerate "waiting" in temporary place-
ments. Id. The logical extension of this theory is that, for a child removed at a
young age, it would not take very long in "adult time" before it became "too late" to
move the child back to a parent. In contrast, a child removed at an older age may
be able to weather years of living apart from her parent and still be able to move
back without serious psychological upset. However, this view runs counter to the
popular notion that young children are the most resilient.
384. The child's preference is not any more dispositive in this kind of case than in
any other custody case. The weight the judge should give it will depend on the age
of the child and the reasons she gives for her preference. "IL]istening to children's
authentic vbices, and employing child-centered practical reasoning are not the same
as allowing children to decide. They are strategies to insure that children's authentic
voices are heard and acknowledged by adults who make decisions." Woodhouse, su-
pra note 165, at 1840. In a reunification case, the child's opinion takes on a special
relevance because it cannot help but provide a very significant indication of the
child's likely ability to adjust to a custody change.
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(6) whether the child has an expectation that the placement
is temporary and that she will return to live with the parent;
and
(7) any other reason affecting the child's ability to adjust to
a move (such as preexisting emotional or developmental
problems).
Another theory also makes the child's psychological needs
paramount but suggests a different approach. Under this theory,
the court would decide reunification cases under a "bright-line"
test based solely on the duration of time that the child has spent
with the nonparent and the child's age when she arrived.38 A
period of as little as two years with the nonparent would cause a
court to find it was "too late" to return the child.386 Like the
impact test, this approach ignores the reason for the separation
of the parent from the child. In contrast to the impact test, how-
ever, it also ignores other considerations that can soften the ef-
fects of the passage of time, such as the frequency and quality of
the child's contact with the parent.38 ' For this reason, the
bright-line approach is too rigid.3
Moreover, it is too simplistic a notion to view time as a
straight line that goes off in the distance forever, making it
increasingly difficult for a child to return to her parent. In cus-
tody matters, time can have more of a "boomerang" effect. As
time passes, the child gets older. A teenager may wish a stron-
385. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 223, at 39-57, 188-89, 194-95.
386. Under the bright-line approach, a child automatically would remain with her
longtime caretaker if she had resided with that caretaker continuously for 12
months, for a child up to three years old at the time of placement, or 24 months,
for a child more than three years old at the time of placement. Id. at 46.
A parent would be entitled to a hearing only if the child was at least five years
old at the time of placement, had lived with the parent for at least three years
prior to the placement, and was not separated from the parent because he had in-
flicted serious bodily injury or sexually abused her. Id. at 47. If entitled to a hear-
ing, the parent would prevail if he could demonstrate that he was still the child's
psychological parent and that returning the child would be the least detrimental
alternative for her. Id. at 48.
387. Garrison, supra note 51, at 455. Professor Garrison also suggests that
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit downplay the impact of the quality of care. Id. at
458-59.
388. See Douglas J. Besharov, Book Review, 34 VAND. L. REV. 481, 483 (1981) (re-
ferring to the "inflexibility of [Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's] decision making rules").
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ger tie with her parent and would be more intellectually capable
of understanding the separation and adjusting to the move."5 9
Given a long enough period of time to allow for her to mature,
the impact of the move on the child might eventually lessen in
some cases.
Judges deciding reunification cases also should consider
whether ordering a structured period of transition would be an
appropriate step. If the sole consideration is the impact of the
move on the child, then the judge may hold the key to the child's
successful readjustment. Rather than denying custody to a par-
ent because a rupture has occurred in the parent-child relation-
ship, the court should take an active role in attempting to repair
that bond. Especially when distance or visitation disputes with
the nonparent have weakened the relationship, a period of grad-
ual transition may be entirely appropriate and just might
change the result."' 0
b. Support from Existing Case Law
Significant case law in many jurisdictions supports the psy-
chological-impact-on-the-child test in reunification cases.3 9'
Once again, although judges speak in terms of rebutting pre-
sumptions, they identify those factors that justify defeating a
389. She probably also would be less vulnerable to the stresses and manipulations
of the adults vying for her loyalties.
390. For example, in Lewis v. Taylor, 554 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1989), the court
ordered a short transition period, apparently to assure a smoother change for the
children and to undo the damage done by the nonparents' resistance to visitation.
See id. at 160, 164. If the structured transition period would exceed one year, how-
ever, it no longer would make practical sense to put off the final decision. At that
point, the court must find for the nonparent. It would then require a showing of a
substantial change in circumstances to reopen and modify the custody arrangement.
391. Commentators reviewing decisions in many states have noted a rather unsur-
prising fact: a court is more likely to grant custody to a nonparent when the child
is already living with him or her. Hill, supra note 6, at 364 n.39; Stephanie H.
Smith, Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biological Parents: The Courts' Response to
New Directions in Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 17 J. FAM. L. 545, 550-52
(1978-1979). Courts have tended to engage in case-by-case analysis without announc-
ing any policy considerations or definitions to explain this statistical tendency. The




parent's claim for custody.392 For this reason, their opinions
are applicable to any sort of preference standard.
The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld a trial court finding
that the nonparent had rebutted the presumption in favor of the
parent when removing the child from a nonparent and awarding
custody to the parent "would be extremely detrimental to the
child and would likely result in permanent damage to her per-
sonality and development."393 Similarly, Virginia courts mea-
sure whether returning custody to a parent would have a "signif-
icant harmful long term impact" on the child."9 ' In Florida, a
court may award custody to a nonparent if awarding custody to
a parent would cause detriment to the child. 95 The Florida
courts have defined detriment as:
circumstances that produce or are likely to produce lasting
mental, physical or emotional harm.... [It is] "more than
the normal trauma caused to a child by uprooting him from
familiar surroundings such as often occurs by reason of di-
vorce, death of a parent or adoption. It contemplates a longer
term adverse effect that transcends the normal adjustment
period in such cases."3"
Usually, reunification cases arise when the child has been
living with the nonparent for many years.9 ' The length of time
alone is not dispositive of the harm the child will suffer if
moved. The level of contact that the parent has maintained with
the child is a very significant factor. A Florida appellate court
overturned the trial court's award of custody to the maternal
392. See, e.g., Look v. Look, 315 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
393. Root v. Alien, 377 P.2d 117, 121 (Colo. 1962) (en banc).
394. Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986).
395. In re D.A.McW., 460 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1984). The court also may deprive
the parent of custody if he is unfit. Id.
396. In re Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Filter v.
Bennett, 554 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). Although recognizing that
any move or loss causes psychological harm to a child, the court viewed detriment
as a black-or-white issue, not a continuum. The court specifically stated that [d]et-
riment . . . cannot be measured in degrees. It either is present or it is not." Id.
397. For example, in Bailes, 340 S.E.2d 824, the child had been living with his
stepmother for eight years when his father died, id. at 825. The court made its
custody decision more than a decade after the child had first begun to live with his
stepmother. Id. at 824-25.
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grandparents despite the fact that the children had been living
with their grandparents for six years. 8' The children had a
strong relationship with their father and stepmother, and the
court had no evidence that there were any special reasons why
the children would not adjust to the move.399 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court also reversed a trial court's award of custody of
an eight-year-old child to his maternal grandmother.4"' The
child had lived with his grandmother since infancy, but his
mother, who was sixteen years old at the time of his birth, had
also lived with them for substantial periods of time.4"' The
Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the boy and his
grandmother were close, but also found a very strong and con-
tinuous relationship between the mother and her son.4"2 In
Connecticut, the Supreme Court upheld a trial court's award of
custody of a child to his mother, even though the child had lived
with his paternal grandparents for almost all of his five
years.4 3 The court upheld a trial court's finding that the nor-
mal adjustment difficulties inherent in the move were not suffi-
cient to constitute detriment.4 4 In all of these cases, the courts
concluded that the child would suffer no significant long-term
effects from returning to live with a parent.4 5
Courts are more likely to find that breaking the bond with the
nonparent will cause long-term harm to the child when the
child's bond with the parent is weak. The Supreme Court of
Alaska endorsed this view when it overturned a trial court's
grant of summary judgment awarding custody of a twelve-year-
398. Matzen, 600 So. 2d at 490. At the time that the court ruled, the children were
eight and ten years old. See id. at 488. The court previously had found the father
unfit but determined that he was rehabilitated because he had remarried and was
leading a stable life. Id. at 489.
399. Id. The court found that the father and the stepmother were aware of and
quite sensitive to the problems that the children would face. Id.
400. Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
401. Id. at 481.
402. Id. at 489. The court concluded that this case did not present a situation in
which an 'extended disruption of parental custody, or other similar extraordinary
circumstances . . . would drastically affect the welfare of the child." Id.
403. Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989).
404. Id. at 910, 916-17.
405. Id. at 916; In re Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see
Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 489.
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old boy to his mother.4" 6 The boy had lived with the nonparent
and his half-sister for ten years and had only sporadic contact
with his mother during the previous several years.40 '
If the child has endured a major trauma or loss that makes
her particularly vulnerable to the emotional stress of changing
caregivers, courts are very likely to find that the parent's claim
for custody does not prevail. In one of the classic third-party
custody cases, the Supreme Court of Colorado granted custody of
a ten-year-old girl to her stepfather after the death of her moth-
er.4"8 The child had an extremely close relationship with her
stepfather and no relationship at all with her father."9 In light
of the trauma that this child had endured when her mother died
and because her stepfather was her "one great stabilizing fac-
tor,"410 the court found that continuity was absolutely neces-
sary for this child.41 ' The Supreme Court of Virginia has ruled
similarly in favor of a third party by affirming a trial court's
award of custody of a teenage boy to his stepmother after his
father's death.4"2 The court found that the child's grief over his
father's death was intense, as evidenced by his threats to run
away or even "to join his father" by committing suicide if the
406. Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 (Alaska 1989). The court remanded the case
for reconsideration. Id. at 989.
407. Id. at 986. The mother and her son had moved in with Mr. Buness when the
boy was two years old. Id. Mr. Buness and Ms. Gillen did not marry, but they did
have a daughter together. Id. The boy's natural father was not a party to the action
nor did the boy have any relationship with him. Id.
408. Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962) (en banc).
409. Id. at 118. The child had not lived with her father since she was less than a
year old. Id. Although the father contributed to her support, his only contact with
his daughter prior to the mother's death had consisted of a short visit when he
identified himself only as a "friend of the family." Id.
410. Id. at 119.
411. Id. at 121.
412. Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986). The boy had lived with his father
since he was a year old. Id. at 825. His father had been remarried to his stepmoth-
er for over ten years, and the, child had visited with his mother only sporadically
before his father's death. Id. at 825-26. The court stated that the visits between the
mother and the son had become more regular and increasingly trouble-free since the
father's death, i&, and hinted that the father had been less than cooperative in
facilitating visitation, see id. The court focused on the existing relationship between
the boy and his mother, regardless of the fault of others in eroding that relation-
ship. Id. at 826.
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court forced him to leave his stepmother.413
In some cases, a special reason causes the court to believe
that a particular child would be incapable of adjusting to a
change in custody. For example, a trial court in Minnesota held
that a nonparent had rebutted the presumption by proving that
an emotionally delayed child would suffer "severe emotional and
behavioral regression" if she moved again, and the Supreme
Court of Minnesota affirmed.414 The Washington Court of Ap-
peals remanded a case involving an abused boy with emotional
problems because the trial court had not considered evidence of
the special needs of a particularly fragile child.41 ' Although
413. Id. In other cases, an extreme reaction to the death of a custodial parent
formed the basis for overcoming the presumption in favor of the surviving parent. In
Turpen v. Turpen, 537 N.E.2d 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), the child had lived with his
father and his paternal grandparents for years, id. at 538. After the father's death,
the child was distraught. Id. at 540. When asked by a therapist to draw his family,
he drew a picture of his dead father and grandparents, but did not include his
mother. Id. The court concluded that moving the boy would provoke a "crisis." Id.
414. Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Minn. 1989). The child had spent
time living in foster care and with her maternal grandmother by the time she was
three and one-half years old. Id. at 150. Her father then placed her with a family
friend. Id. After six months, the friend sought to formalize her custody of the child.
Id. By the time the Minnesota Supreme Court heard the case, the child had lived
with the nonparent for three years-almost half of her life. Id.
415. Stell v. Stell, 783 P.2d 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). The child was a seven-
year-old boy. Id. at 617. He had suffered abuse as an infant when in the care of his
mother. Id. at 618. When the child was four and a half, his father voluntarily had
placed him with the father's sister to assure that the boy had access to appropriate
therapy. Id. After the boy had lived with his aunt for more than a year, she re-
quested joint custody of the child. Id. The appellate court held that, to prevail, the
aunt had to establish that "circumstances are such that the child's growth and de-
velopment would be detrimentally affected by placement with an otherwise fit par-
ent." Id. at 620 (quoting In re Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)). Be-
cause the nonparent had the burden of proof, the court concluded that the trial
court had committed error by excluding evidence from the boy's therapist about the
effect of a change in custody. Id. at 620-21.
In Hughes v. McKenzie, 539 So. 2d 965 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 542 So. 2d
1388 (La. 1989), a Louisiana appellate court also stated that a child's fragile emo-
tional condition could result in permanent harm if it removed the child from a sta-
ble home, id. at 971. The court specified that trial courts should consider any devel-
opmental difficulties, abnormal overdependency, or emotional instability, and whether
the child had been in multiple placements. Id. at 970-71. However, the case before
the court did not include any evidence of such conditions. The case involved a four-
year-old child who had been living with the mother's cousin since birth, with the
parents' initial consent. Id. at 966. The length of time that the child had been with
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most of these cases focus on the emotional needs of the child,
one court found the unique physical needs of the child sufficient
to overcome the parental presumption and granted custody to a
stepparent because she was the only caretaker able to cope with
the child's hearing impairment.41
c. Burden and Quantum of Proof
The nonparent must have the burden of proving that the
move will cause long-term serious psychological harm to the
child.41 7 The nonparent bears the burden of persuasion for all
of the reasons that make the preference standard the appropri-
ate test in the first place. It also would be very difficult for the
parent to prove a negative-that the move would not cause the
child serious harm in the future.
Nonetheless, the nonparent cannot easily prove the likelihood
of a future occurrence. Further, that future occurrence is a very
important consideration-whether the child will suffer signifi-
cant emotional harm. The risk of an error is serious. Requiring
too high a level of proof would undermine the goal of putting the
child's long-term needs at the fore. The preference should func-
tion to reunite most parents with their children, but it must not
make it impossible for the nonparent to prevail when such an
outcome is warranted. For these reasons, the nonparent should
have the burden of proving the impact on the child only by a
preponderance of the evidence.4"8
the nonparent and the lack of a strong relationship with her parents more properly
explained the court's decision to affirm the trial court's award of custody to the
nonparent. However, because the court described in detail the instability of the
parents' marriage, including the father's adultery with another young family member,
id. at 970, the decision is more a criticism of parental conduct than a detailed anal-
ysis of the impact of a move on the child.
416. In Allen, 626 P.2d 16, a stepmother prevailed in a custody dispute with the
child's natural father after their divorce. The child was hearing-impaired, and the
court was persuaded by the fact that, when the family was intact, it was the step-
mother who had learned sign language and had attended to the child's special
needs. Id. at 23. Under one approach, this case would not constitute a third-party
custody case, but instead a parent-versus-parent case best decided under a best
interests test. See supra part IAL..b.
417. The nonparent should bear the burden of persuasion, regardless of which party
initiated the action.
418. The Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), did not require the
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D. Proposed Legislation
A third-party custody statute, even one that incorporates all of
the recommendations in this Article, cannot stand on its own in
every jurisdiction. Lawmakers must tailor it to fit into the spac-
es left by the subject matter jurisdiction and standing rules of
each state.
Policymakers must recognize the similarities among all child
removal systems and should set certain goals for themselves
when making any necessary adjustments to the proposed third-
party custody statute. First, the various statutes and court sys-
tems that address custody, guardianship, or any other child re-
moval provisions should have a unitary test, or at least consis-
tently defined standards. Such uniformity removes the forum-
shopping potential because the result would not differ depending
on an accident or manipulation of jurisdiction. Second, the bur-
den and levels of proof should not differ because of procedural or
jurisdictional considerations, such as which party is the movant,
or in which court the movant files the claim for custody.419
The statute proposed in this Article assumes that nonparents
have standing to initiate a removal case, at least through a
permissive intervention rule. Substantively, however, a jurisdic-
tion can achieve a result similar to the one recommended in the
proposed legislation by denying the nonparent standing. The
nonparent would then have to pursue the matter in a juvenile or
probate court, where the court would apply a test with a strong
preference for the parent. However, efficiency concerns suggest
that allowing removal cases to proceed, at least through inter-
vention into an existing case between the parents, is the better
approach. If a custody action between the parents is pending
use of a clear and convincing standard because the case was not a termination ac-
tion, id. at 756-57. In some states, however, the adoption of a clear and convincing
standard may be preferable. The reunification case burden and level of proof stan-
dards should be consistent with the standards by which a parent can resume custo-
dy or guardianship in an abuse and neglect case.
419. There is also no logical basis for a difference in the parties' and the child's
access to affordable or free counsel and to support services. Although states would
experience a significant budgetary impact if they had to offer the same services to
third-party custody parties that they offer to individuals involved in child abuse and
neglect proceedings, that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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and there is a genuine fitness question as to both parents, it
wastes everyone's time, as well as their financial and emotional
resources, to require the nonparents to commence a separate
action in another court.
AN ACT CONCERNING CUSTODY DISPUTES
BETWEEN PARENTS AND NONPARENTS
A. DEFINITIONS
1. Parent: A parent is any person who is the biological parent of
a child or who has adopted a child, if the adoption is final.
2. Nonparent: A nonparent is any person who is not a parent,
including a grandparent, a stepparent, another relative related
by blood or marriage, a foster parent, or a prospective adoptive
parent, whether or not the individual is currently providing
custodial care for the child.
3. Third-party custody proceeding: A third-party custody pro-
ceeding is a child custody proceeding between a parent and a
nonparent, whether of the same or of the opposite gender. This
category includes disputes between a parent and a prospective
adoptive parent or parents who have been caring for the child.
This category does not include:
a. proceedings between two women who both have a biological
connection to the child, one by contributing the ovum and one
by gestating the fetus; or
b. proceedings that arise out of a failed surrogacy or sperm
donation agreement; or
c. proceedings that arise because the child is living with a
nonparent as a result of a kidnapping or custodial interference.
4. Removal case: A removal case is a third-party custody pro-
ceeding in which:
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a. the child is living with the parent; or
b. the child has been living with the nonparent for less than
six months; and there is no court order granting custody to
the nonparent; and the parent originally consented to the
child living with the nonparent but has since withdrawn con-
sent; or
c. the court previously removed the child from the parent by
issuing a temporary emergency order without full hearing or
based only on a finding of probable cause that the parent was
incapable of meeting the child's basic needs.
5. Reunification case: A reunification case is a third-party custo-
dy proceeding in which:
a. the child has been in the custodial care of the nonparent for
more than six months; and
b. the child has resided with the nonparent as a result of a
court order in a removal case; or
c. the child's parent who is a party to the proceeding v o 1 u n -
tarily placed the child with the nonparent, or consented to
such placement, regardless of the reason; or
d. the child came to live with the nonparent because the other
parent who is not a party to the proceeding arranged for the
child to live with the nonparent.
It is not necessary for the parent who is a party to the proceed-
ing and the child to have lived together previously.
B. STANDARD
1. Preference: In every third-party custody proceeding, there
shall be a preference that the parent shall have custody of his or
her child; except that in any dispute between a parent and a
nonparent, whether of the same or of the opposite gender, who
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have married or cohabitated together with the child for more
than one year with the intention of creating a nuclear family,
the court shall decide custody on the basis of the best interests
of the child.
2. Overcoming the Preference:
a. In all third-party custody proceedings, the nonparent shall
have the burden of overcoming the preference, regardless of
the procedural posture of the case or which party initiated the
complaint, or with whom the child currently is living.
b. Removal cases:
i. The preference shall be overcome only by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the parent is presently unfit due to
ongoing abuse or neglect of the child or that the parent is
presently incapable of meeting the child's minimum needs
for:
(A) love and affection;
(B) food, clothing, and medical care;
(C) adequate residential arrangements;
(D) social and educational guidance; and
(E) freedom from physical harm.
ii. The court shall make every effort to ensure that the par-
ent and the child have access to supportive services to pro-
vide assistance to obviate the need for removal.
iii. If the court removes the child, the court shall:
(A) state in writing the reasons for removal and the steps
that the court would require of the parent for eventual
reunification;
(B) order that rehabilitative or supportive services be
made available to the parent;
(C) order counseling for the parent and child, separately
or together; and
(D) order the maximum feasible visitation between the
parent and the child, including overnight visits when
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appropriate and safe for the child. The court shall contin-
ue jurisdiction over the case for at least one year, regard-
less of whether the parties file any postjudgment mo-
tions. The court shall, sua sponte, hold a monitoring
hearing no later than one year after entering judgment
and at any time thereafter as the court deems necessary.
c. Reunification cases:
i. If the court has previously removed the child under the
removal standard outlined in this Act or its equivalent, the
parent has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the original cause for the removal no longer
exists and that he or she is capable of meeting the child's
minimum needs, as defined in section (B)(2)(b)(1).
ii. If the child is residing with the nonparent without prior
court order or finding of parental unfitness or incapacity,
the nonparent may allege that the parent is unfit or incapa-
ble. The nonparent has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or incapable, as
defined in section (B)(2)(b)(1).
iii. If the court finds that the parent is not unfit or incapa-
ble, then the preference is overcome only by proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the change in custody
would cause long-term and substantial psychological or
emotional harm to the child.
iv. In determining whether the change in custody will cause
long-term and substantial psychological or emotional harm,
the court shall consider:
(A) the level of integration of the child in the nonparent's
home, including the length of time the child has been
there, his or her age at arrival, and his or her attachment
to any half- or step-siblings;
(B) the strength of the existing bond between the child
and the parent, including whether he or she has ever




(C) the likelihood that the bond with the parent could be-
come stronger within a reasonable length of time;
(D) the parent's awareness of the child's potential read-
justment problems and willingness to address them ap-
propriately;
(E) the child's preference;
(F) whether the child has an expectation that the place-
ment is temporary and that he or she will return to live
with the parent; and
(G) any other reasons affecting the child's ability to ad-
just to a change in custody, including preexisting emo-
tional or developmental problems.
v. The child's opinion shall not be dispositive but is relevant
and probative evidence of his or her ability to adjust to the
change in custody.
vi. If the court finds that an immediate change in custody
will cause the child long-term psychological or emotional
harm, the court shall then consider whether a gradual tran-
sition period, not to exceed one year, would lessen suffi-
ciently the negative impact of the custody change. If so, the
court shall enter transitional orders, including a gradual
increase in visitation, designed to result in a change in
custody within one year. If the court finds that a transition
period of one year or less will not sufficiently reduce the
harm to the child, the court shall order that the nonparent
shall retain custody of the child.
vii. Once the court has found in favor of a nonparent in a
reunification case, the court may modify custody only upon
a finding of a substantial change in circumstances. Such
change must be of a nature that indicates either:
(A) the nonparent is no longer capable of caring for the
child; or
(B) the relationship between the parent and the child has
strengthened such that the child prefers to live with the
parent.
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C. PROCESS
The court shall expedite the handling of third-party custody
proceedings by court staff by engaging family service agencies to
evaluate reunification cases and by giving any contested hear-
ings priority on the trial list. In each case, the court shall con-
sider the appropriateness of disregarding the length of time of
any separation of parent and child caused by the litigation pro-
cess. If the child was three years old or younger at the time he
or she began living with the nonparent, however, the court shall
not disregard the length of separation caused by the litigation
process. The court also shall not disregard any delay that is
solely the responsibility of, or the result of noncooperation by,
the parent.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article provides a blueprint for deciding third-party cus-
tody cases. It recommends a system of categories and standards
tailored to respond to the differing equitable concerns that each
type of case presents. Each standard is designed to put the
child's most salient needs at the forefront of the court's inquiry.
But will the blueprint work?42 Using this statute, how
would a court evaluate and decide each of the five illustrative
stories identified at the beginning of this Article?
Case 1: If the mother can provide her child with his basic
needs, through public assistance or through employment, she
will retain custody, regardless of the material and even emo-
tional advantages that the grandmother can offer or of the
amount of love between the boy and his grandmother. Nothing
420. This very question implies that the current system does not work and requires
some definition of the standards for judging whether any system "works." This Arti-
cle suggests that trial judges should receive more and clearer direction and, regretta-
bly, less discretion. However, the creation of more rigid categories increases the risk
that those established will not be able to account for all the permutations presented
by future cases. Questions remain both regarding whether the model statute sug-
gested in this Article allows for just results in every imaginable variation, and, more
importantly, regarding which results are "just." It is through the eyes and heart of
the child that we should judge the result.
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suggests that the mother is not meeting her child's minimum
physical and emotional needs, so she should prevail.
Case 2: The court will decide custody by judging the husband
and the wife under the traditional best-interests-of-the-child
test. The wife's lack of a biological link to the child that she has
raised for over ten years is irrelevant. If the mother has been
the primary caretaker of the child, she probably will prevail.
Case 3: Although he deserves commendation for his faithful
visits and support, the father will not prevail on those grounds
alone. The court will weigh the strength of the bond between
the child and her father and the bond between the child and
her stepfather and half-siblings. The loss of her mother will
play a significant role in this analysis. If the child cannot with-
stand more change, she may remain with her stepfather, at
least for the time being. If the father is the child's main source
of emotional support and comfort, however, he certainly will
prevail.
Case 4: Even if the nonparents have a larger home and are
highly educated, these factors should not affect the decision.
The boys may be doing well in their current school, but they do
wonder about their mother. The mother agrees to continue in
counseling for herself and to include her children in the ses-
sions when appropriate. Because the mother has visited the
children only twice in the last year and has a new apartment
that the boys have never seen, the court will order three
months of gradually increasing visitation at the mother's home.
Thereafter, the court will award her full custody.
Case 5: The father's diligence in pursuing contact with his child
is commendable and certainly understandable, but the court
will not award custody solely on that basis. The court will grant
custody to the nonparents, with gradually increasing visitation
for the father. Due to the child's young age and the complete
absence of a prior relationship between the father and the
daughter, it would be too traumatic for the child to change cus-
tody at any time within the next year. If the father and the
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daughter continue to visit regularly, and, much later, she asks
to live with him, he might then prevail on a motion to modify
custody.
Many families appear to be in chaos and disarray, often suf-
fering the effects of parental illness, substance abuse, and fi-
nancial crises. More and more, family courts will have to decide
when and for what reasons to remove a child from one or both
parents. When the extended family and friends have stepped in,
rather than the state foster care system, courts will end up ad-
dressing complex and painfully emotional reunification cases
that surely will stretch and test the importance of the biological
connection.
Some third-party custody cases are heartbreaking; all of them
force tough custody choices. In each, courts must use standards
designed to give the child the best chance of emerging from the
process emotionally intact. The law must require the judges
and, in their wake, the lawyers and litigants, to view the world
through the eyes of the child at the center of the storm and to
listen to the voice of the child.42'
421. Professor Woodhouse has coined the term "generism" to define a critical per-
spective "that would evaluate parents' authority over children and their obligations
to children, and to each other, through the lens of children's needs and experiences."
Woodhouse, supra note 165, at 1749.
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